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Donald J. Kochan*

THE MARKET TO ROAM:
USING SHARING ECONOMY PLATFORMS
FOR EXPANDING ROAMING ACCESS
TO LAND RESOURCES
ABSTRACT
Outdoor recreation is big business. And, the majority of
recreationalists do not have their own property upon which to
recreate or roam. This article proposes a framework for a market
to roam, where technology-facilitated bargaining leads to
transfers of roaming rights and the provision of access across
private lands. Such a system can borrow from what we know
about traditional land use cooperation platforms, together with
what we are learning from the sharing economy and its use of
technology platforms to assist with matching owners of underutilized resources with individuals interested in accessing or
using those resources. The article engages with property law
debates over the capability of the property system to support
subdivision of rights, or sticks, in the property rights bundle. New
sharing economy mechanisms are demonstrating just how such
technologies can make transactions in subdivided property
bundles more accessible to owners and users of property.
Expanded access to interact with ecological resources while
roaming on private lands could be obtained through strong
exclusion rights facilitated by innovative technologies and
organizational models that help foster greater inclusion through
easy and accountable access rights. The article concludes that an
exclusion rights-based market to roam is superior for achieving
the ecological and other ends progressive property scholars seek
when advocating for mandatory access and free roaming rights.
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INTRODUCTION

If strangers want to roam on and through the property of others, is it a
natural right of the roamer to do so, is it something the law should create as an
enforceable right that supersedes an owner’s right to exclude others, or is it the
kind of right that should be generated only after bargaining in a market-based
exchange (like when someone rents your house)? These are the questions this
article encounters as it examines a demand for rights to roam juxtaposed against
varying proposals to supply it. The debate over roaming rights has so far been
dominated by advocacy toward state-based conferral of such rights at the expense
of property owners’ exclusion powers. This article seeks to balance that debate by
asking whether we should instead strive toward laying the groundwork for a
“market to roam.” Such a market would involve buying and selling access rights to
private lands enabling what would otherwise be strangers to those lands to lawfully
roam (i.e., hike, walk, wander, meander, or otherwise tour) across another’s land.
Market mechanisms could develop to facilitate consensual exchanges between
property owner-suppliers and roamer-consumers.
Interest in recreation and recreation markets is booming and on an upward
trend.1 According to a February 2018 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of
Economic Analysis report, “the outdoor recreation economy accounted for 2.0
percent ($373.7 billion) of current-dollar GDP in 2016.2 In addition, the outdoor
recreation economy grew 3.8 percent in 2016, compared to growth of 2.8 percent in
the overall economy.”3 Within this industry, there is an increasingly evident
demand for broader access to private and public lands for recreational purposes.
This demand includes what might be called “roaming” rights or privileges that
would allow individuals not presently entitled by ownership rights to obtain such
rights through property rights purchases (by easement or other means), contractual
exchange, or even through coercive mandate.
Within a system of governance in which most ownership is defined by
principles of private property rights, most often we are talking about boundaries
and borders governed by principles of dominion and control.4 To the extent we talk
1. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, News Release, Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account:
Prototype Statistics for 2012-2016, (Feb. 14, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.bea.gov/news/2018/outdoorrecreation-satellite-account-prototype-estimates-2012-2016 [hereinafter 2018 BEA Report]; see also
Jodi Peterson, Latest: Outdoor Recreation Recognized as Economic Contributor, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/issues/50.4/latest-outdoor-recreation-recognized-aseconomic-contributor/print_view (“the federal government has recognized outdoor recreation as an
official industry. In early February, the Commerce Department announced that outdoor rec contributed
more than $373 billion toward the gross domestic product in 2016, about 2 percent of the total. It’s the
first time that the GDP report included separate figures on the industry’s value.”).
2. 2018 BEA Report, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Consider, for example, default common law rule of trespass: “At common law, every person’s
land is deemed to be enclosed, and landowners have the right to exclude persons from trespassing on
private property. Accordingly, every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close, or
private property, of another is a trespass at common law, which necessarily carries with it some damage
for which the trespasser is liable.” 75 AM. JUR. 2D TRESPASS § 18 (2007); but see generally Nicholas
Blomley, The Boundaries of Property: Complexity, Relationality, and Spatiality, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
224, 252 (2016) (arguing for a less simple understanding of property boundaries given that they must be
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about access, we are most often speaking about gates and entry governed by default
rules of prohibition overcome only by showings of permissions and purchase. This
boundary-based perspective means that access to property usually starts from a
position in which private property owners are presumptively in control. Inherent in
that system, then, are limits to access by non-owners. In fact, the architecture of the
system creates “a perception that public use and private ownership are in conflict
and non-compatible.”5 Consequently, it is not surprising when our system of
private property frustrates those who want to enjoy some of the land seemingly
monopolized by landowners, especially when they feel like these barriers fence off
nature itself or make publicly valuable resources inaccessible.6 The desire to
recreate and roam without borders exists. How we reconcile that desire with
intentional tensions of a private property system becomes part of the policy
struggle engaged in this article.
Of course, everything is more nuanced in a legal system than it may
immediately seem when a debate first reveals itself. Our system has never fully
recognized a strict dichotomy between exclusion and access in absolutes, with
varied forms of mandated and customary access rights existing throughout the
states. As Professor Robert Ellickson opined, property systems regularly become “a
major battleground” on which the conflict “between individual liberty and privacy
on the one hand and community and equality on the other” is fought.7 Nonetheless,
as this article will detail, there has been a heavy thumb on the scale in these battles
toward exclusion rights for private property owners.
The manner in which we juggle interest in public access to resources and
property rights has been an area of longstanding debate, and questions regarding
how we achieve recreational access in particular have become increasingly present
in these discussions. Outdoor recreation has seen such an upsurge that Professor
Carol Rose, for example, has focused on calling it “a socializing institution” that
“now seems to support the ‘publicness’ of some property.”8
Those types of claims undergird the beliefs of some that the public should
have the automatic privilege to access private lands through a mandated “right to
roam.” Progressive property scholars, for example, increasingly discuss the “right
to roam” as an exemplar of socially beneficial policies that do not rely on and/or

understood in conjunction with their role in identifying spatiality and social relationality—i.e.
“boundaries do not stand outside the relations that constitute them and the geographies in which they are
situated”).
5. Neil D. Hamilton, Rural Lands and Rural Livelihoods: Using Land and Natural Resources to
Revitalize Rural America, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 179, 200 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Right: The Right to
Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539, 545 (2006) [hereinafter Anderson, Comparative Perspectives] (“Many
of us may have felt a similar frustration trying to reach some allegedly “public” resource—perhaps a
beach or a beautiful mountain—and being confronted with a solid barrier of private property that limited
access.”).
7. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1345 (1993).
8. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986).
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reject the supremacy of the right to exclude.9 They argue that mandating inclusion
is often socially optimal, including generating opportunities to access ecological
and other land resources that would otherwise be off limits to others if strong
private property exclusion norms were enforced.10 Why, however, must we assume
that markets and strong exclusion norms are incapable of also generating roaming
rights with similar beneficial effects? Professors Jonathan Klick and Gideon
Parchomovsky have posited that “nowhere are the fault lines between [property
exclusion essentialism advocates and progressive property theorists] clearer than in
the context of the right to roam.”11
Yet, as Ken Ilgunas, author of Trespassing Across America and an
advocate for governmentally-mandated rights to roam, laments in a 2016 op-ed,
“there has never been a mainstream conversation about [the right to roam]. There
are a few advocates in law journals, but none have made a splash outside of their
field.”12 Ilgunas is correct that the debate deserves more attention, but this article
contends that the conversation also needs to widen the perspectives it invites. The
existing discussion is limited in audience, as Ilgunas recognizes, and it is also
limited in scope. Too often that conversation is dominated by those seeking to push
for coercive mechanisms limiting the right to exclude in order to accomplish
satisfaction of roaming preferences. An alternative dialogue would consider
embracing the right to exclude as a means of facilitating inclusion-based and
access-sensitive exchange. This article seeks to expand that conversation,
especially by injecting more discussion about market-based approaches to
supplying roaming opportunities. It concludes that time-tested contractual and
property law mechanisms can be used by innovators and entrepreneurs to develop
ways for landowners to offer access rights to consumers interested in roaming
across their lands. Moreover, we should find ways to make the law friendly to such
innovation, developing legal mechanisms that support and encourage such a market
to roam.
In Part II, this article sketches a blueprint from which legal institutions
might launch a project of assistance that can guide a roaming market into existence.
It posits that—whether through contract forms or property forms—a market to

9. Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413, 46265 (2017) (“Progressive property works often cite rights to roam as an example of progressive property
in action.”).
10. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 921 (2017) (“the ambition of the progressive property
movement is unabashedly normative: it calls for the furtherance of such values as civil responsibility,
environmental stewardship, life, human flourishing, autonomy, freedom, and ‘individual and social
well-being’” and stating that they “refer to progressive property scholars as the ‘pro-access camp.’”);
John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV.
739, 745 n.17 (2011) [hereinafter Lovett, Progressive Property] (discussing the connection land access
brings between users and land virtues, including engagement with land’s complex “ecological and
environmental characteristics”); see also generally Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private
Land for Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting the Right to
Exclude, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 260-62 (2011).
11. Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 921.
12. Ken Ilgunas, This is Our Country. Let’s Walk It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/opinion/sunday/this-is-our-country-lets-walk-it.html?_r=0.
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roam could develop in which private property owners and roamers efficiently
bargain for roaming rights with the aid of new technology.
Part III describes the evidence of demand for greater access to private
lands and explains ways in which both the markets and governmental actors have
responded. Part IV discusses the growing body of progressive property scholarship
that draws on the right to roam in its efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the state
to facilitate inclusion opportunities that advance human flourishing.
In Parts V and VI, this article challenges some of the assumptions of
progressive property scholars and others that roaming rights can only be
accomplished by coercive commands. The social utility from access and interaction
with ecological resources could be obtained through strong exclusion rights
facilitated by innovative technologies and organizational models that help foster
greater inclusion through easy and accountable licensing. As Jonathan Adler
explains, “Environmental problems . . . are often essentially ‘property rights
problems’ and are best redressed by the extension, definition, and defense of
property rights in environmental resources.”13 These Parts describe some of the
ways that new technology is expanding opportunities for property owners to choose
inclusion, drawing substantially on insights from the market forces driving the
sharing economy14 and the platforms that facilitate these new categories of
commerce.
Part VII focuses on the legal mechanisms by which tradeable roaming
rights might be created – principally contracts, existing property forms like
easements and licenses, and potential new property forms. Part VII concludes that
contracts and existing property forms should be able to do the work necessary to
provide the legal mechanisms for roaming rights exchange. Nonetheless, even if
new property forms would be necessary, it should not be problematic. So, while
Part VII discusses the literature on limitations on property forms and the reasons
for prohibiting the development of customized property interests, this literature
leaves room for the evolution and adaptability of property forms—especially when
new technology makes such new forms available without negative impacts on third
party information costs and other standardization principles. When coupled with
the understanding of the emerging technologies discussed in Part VI, there is room
to believe that it is possible to segregate roaming rights sticks within the property
rights bundle.
Part VIII describes some of the operational kinks that will need to be
worked out if a market to roam is to emerge. It discusses subjects like owner
liability to roamers, the applicability and limitations of recreational use statutes to
ease such concerns, the need to manage adverse possession risks, public safety

13. Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property
Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 987, 1021 (2005) (citing Peter J. Hill &
Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights and Externalities: Problems and Solutions, in WHO OWNS THE
ENVIRONMENT? xi (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998)).
14. Although it is a concept without exact definition, the “sharing economy” can be identified
“inclusively to mean an ‘economic model where people are creating and sharing goods, services, space
and money with each other.’” Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy,
53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147, 150 (2016).
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concerns, and other areas that should be on the checklist of any up and coming
entrepreneurs who will begin to design a market to roam.
After explaining what is possible within the law to facilitate a market to
roam, Part IX explores some of the advantages of market-based roaming over the
compelled access that has been the preferred means to date to accomplish roaming
goals. It defends a market-oriented approach to achieving roaming values as
comparatively superior to a less accountable coercive mandate that would require
private owners to cede portions of their exclusion rights by granting permission
rights to strangers to roam without consent or compensation. Not only does marketbased roaming increase access (including to ecological resources) without
diminishing property rights or depriving owners of their gatekeeping powers, it also
has the added benefit of superior monitoring and accountability measures.
Instead of facilitating roaming by constricting exclusion rights—the result
of most proposals to inject roaming opportunities in the United States and
elsewhere15—this article concludes in Part X that the desired ends of roaming
facilitation can be reached by actually embracing exclusion with its logical
outgrowths and extensions. Discussions regarding how best to protect ecological
resources often create “tensions between liberal values and environmental
protection.”16 This article challenges the notion that these must be mutually
exclusive sets of protected concerns. Because the consensus is that the United
States is unlikely to any time soon, if ever, adopt roaming legislation like that seen
in other countries,17 to the extent advocates wish to reach a point where greater
inclusion for roaming is possible, they should welcome a conversation about an
approach that achieves those ends through market forces.
II.

WHAT IS THE MARKET TO ROAM? A BRIEF SKETCH

“Roaming” is a word that generally captures the idea of walking, hiking,
or even wandering across land, sometimes defined as “to travel purposefully
unhindered through a wide area” or “to go from place to place without purpose or
direction.”18 As used in the literature on property rights, roaming access debates

15. Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 224-25
(2011) (explaining that roaming rights in the United Kingdom and Norway are an example of a place
where the “exclusion rights of real property owners have been contracted in various ways in response to
changing social needs.”).
16. Adler, supra note 13, at 990.
17. Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 432 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam] (“Short of
a revolution in American thinking about the right to exclude, however, it is difficult to imagine serious
modifications to the right to exclude anytime soon.”); John D. Echeverria, From a “Darkling Plain” to
What?: The Regulatory Takings Issue in U.S. Law and Policy, 30 VT. L. REV. 969, 978 (2006) (“Great
Britain recently adopted national legislation affirming the public’s ‘right to roam’ across unenclosed,
rural lands. For better or for worse, such a measure would be dead on arrival constitutionally in the
United States, at least for the foreseeable future.”); Robertson, supra note 10, at 260-62 (concluding that
the exclusion tradition in the United States makes roaming mandates unlikely); Ilgunas, supra note 12
(recognizing “a national right to roam law is unlikely” but, short of that, advocating for “ways that state
governments can create better green and coastal walking spaces now.”).
18. Roaming, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/roam (last visited
Sept. 9, 2018).
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usually focus on whether individuals may do this roaming across private or public
lands, the surface fee of which the roamer does not presently own.19 Presumably,
“roaming” rights—whether established by private agreements or by governmental
mandate—could be defined to include access alone (such as for hiking, walking, or
wandering) or to also include a variety of activities as permissible once these lands
are accessible (including camping, hunting, picking, swimming, or foraging). Most
of the roaming access advocacy, from progressive property scholars and other
outdoor enthusiasts, operates on perceptions of the necessity of state intervention in
markets to bring about the availability of roaming rights. This article’s primary
purpose is to open up discussion which challenges that presumption. Based on law
and technology’s track record at developing and adapting to provide access to other
things (home, apartments, cars, tools, etc. in the new sharing eceonomy), there is
good reason to believe that the advent of new technology should make possible
exchange of roaming “sticks” in the property rights bundle or contractual
arrangements between willing owners and willing roamers that can expand roaming
access without losing the valuable benefits of robust exclusion rights in our
property system. As a launching point, it seems useful to begin this Article’s
discussion by dedicating this part to a very brief synopsis of the project
contemplated. In other words, this part provides a sketch of how a market to roam
might work.
A market to roam can best be realized by learning from and adapting the
architecture of existing business models in the sharing economy (such as the use of
technological platforms to connect willing owners of goods or property with those
desiring but lacking access to goods or property, the reputational quality control
mechanisms such platforms facilitate, and the trustworthy and customized
contracting and exchange forms) to the roaming enterprise. Increasingly, members
of society are becoming familiar with homesharing platforms apps like Airbnb that
connect willing property owner hosts with willing non-owners looking for a shortterm place to stay.20 When we think of a market to roam, we can imagine platforms
emerging that facilitate similar connections.21 Willing property owner hosts could
supply their land, in part or whole, as available for roaming. Individuals who want
to roam across property could seek out a platform where the willing hosts list their
properties and where the roamers go to obtain the rights to roam across the land of
a stranger—just as guests using Airbnb obtain the rights to sleep in the stranger’s
bed. Much like Airbnb offers a temporary residence to a demanding public in a
home or Uber offers a ride in a car—each involving access to assets that the
consumer of those services could not afford or simply does not want to buy
outright—a roaming market would allow recreationalists to obtain rights to access

19. See generally, e.g., Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17.
20. See generally infra Part VI.
21. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 106-107 (2016) (describing the
basic features of platforms, including how platforms utilize technology (including smart phones,
internet, algorithms, rating data, information compilation, and the like) to dramatically reduce the
transaction costs that a Coasean model traditionally understood to be barriers to many exchanges).
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vast amounts of land that those roamers could not afford or would not want to
buy.22 We might call it the Uberization of trails.23
Ultimately, though, platforms for the market to roam will undoubtedly
generate their own unique characteristics to match the unique product to unique
demands. For example, a roamer usually needs rights to cross more than one
property at a time in order to have a good hike or a valuable experience, unlike the
Airbnb or Uber customer who is likely to rent only one house or one car at a time.
Thus, the roaming platforms may need to add in some multi-property coordination
components. On this, perhaps the architects of roaming platforms could borrow
features and learn lessons from platforms like Spotify24 or ASCAP,25 where
customers buy a license to access the work of all of the artists in the platform rather
than just one at a time, thereby overcoming insurmountably high transaction costs
of negotiating with every individual participant. Perhaps the property owners who
agree to place their properties as available for roaming could be treated like the
artists who allow their music to be available for streaming and where the end-user
negotiates only with the platform as the intermediary compiler, or assembler, of the
properties. The artists win too because they need not negotiate with each consumer,
but instead set upon terms with the platform to compensate them based on the level
of consumption of their art. In a roaming market, property owners might benefit by
registering their property with a platform rather than dealing with every roamer.
However it would be run, the essence of a market to roam is to generate
roaming rights through consensual exchange. Individual property owners would
opt-in to a property law and contract law governance regime that manages roaming
rights and transfers rather than have their exclusion rights limited through
requirements to allow strangers to stomp through their land.
Property owners or the platforms that manage their rights could offer
roaming for free or at a price. Individual roamers could purchase general licenses
that work with all participating property owners or could purchase individual
licenses that might be triggered by some geo-tag alert that would be received on a
smartphone or other mobile electronic device when the roamer hits a boundary.
When a roamer is pinged that they are entering into a new property, they might be
22. Id. at 110 (explaining that for many products it is cheaper to buy access than to buy the
product).
23. Id. at 89 (describing how platforms create the possibility of “the Uberization of everything.”).
24. What is Spotify, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/is/using_spotify/the_basics/what-isspotify/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (describing Spotify as “a digital music, podcast, and video streaming
service that gives you access to millions of songs and other content from artists all over the world. Basic
functions such as playing music are totally free, but you can also choose to upgrade to Spotify Premium.
Either way, you can:
Choose what you want to listen to with Browse and Search.
Get recommendations from personalized features . . .
Build collections of music.
See what friends, artists, and celebrities listen to.
Create your own Radio stations.”).
25. About ASCAP, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/about-us (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (ASCAP
“license[s] over 11.5 million ASCAP songs and scores to the businesses that play them publicly, then
send[s] the money to [its] members as royalties” and it uses “cutting-edge technology to process over
one trillion performances every year.”).
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asked to enter into a new transaction or register their presence. Roamers might buy
bundles or packages in advance from a platform that allows them to roam across
multiple properties in a single trip, thereby minimizing the disruption of engaging
in new transactions at every boundary crossing.
Technicians could create protective features as well. If roamers could be
tracked and monitored by having their GPS location or other information
transmitted to owners through a signal generated on the roamer’s mobile device,
for example, liability for damages could be more accurately traced and assessed
with lower identification costs. If, for example, we know that roamer X was at
location Z when a fire started there, we could identify the responsible party. We
could create a responsible roaming regime in which roamers are required to better
internalize the costs of their actions and be held responsible for damage to property,
encouraging the roamers to be good stewards as they roam (and holding them
responsible if they are not). By harnessing what we know about the sharing
economy and the utility of platform technology, a market to roam seems
achievable.
III.

EVIDENCE OF DEMAND, AND SOME RESPONSE WITH
SUPPLY BY MARKETS AND BY GOVERNMENT MEANS

Past access-based innovations can serve as models that should make us
optimistic about the feasibility of this article’s proposals. We should develop a
framework for a system for licensing or otherwise granting roaming rights that will
borrow from what we can learn from these traditional land use cooperation
platforms. We can also learn from the sharing economy and its use of technology
platforms, discussed later, to assist with matching owners of under-utilized
resources with individuals interested in using those resources.
A number of market and governmental moves signal the existence of
consumer demand for more opportunities to access private property for roaming
and other recreational purposes. If those signals are accurate, wise innovators
should begin to find ways to generate a market-based supply of roaming rights.
Under normal market conditions, economic theory predicts that when a demand for
a product emerges, the supply follows. Sometimes innovation is required to figure
out how to generate the product and satisfy the demand. Oftentimes that involves
technical innovation. Sometimes, however, legal innovation is required as well—to
overcome existing legal hurdles or to develop legal instruments that can clear the
way for economic markets to create and offer the products being demanded, for
example. In fact, the way the law reacts will often influence the shape of the market
products available.
Outdoor recreation is big business. And, the majority of recreationalists do
not have their own property upon which to recreate or roam. Matching roamers
with property that can be used to satisfy their recreational preferences is one of the
challenges at the foundation of this article. Existing regimes for the supply of
access rights demonstrates there is a demand. The question remains whether the
market or government mandates should be used to satisfy that demand. There are
emerging market-based exchange mechanisms that are already working to expand
access opportunities. If the market starts to generate new vehicles for access
agreements, there are likely individuals who would engage in that marketplace as
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consumers of the roaming rights products. Still, governments, principally states,
have also mandated rights of access, structured their laws with rebuttable
presumptions of access rights, or initiated programs that help coordinate access
agreements between private property landowners and members of the public.
A.

Limited and Targeted Supply by Market Products

The excitement for using market-based techniques—particularly sharing
economy ideas—to achieve resource protection and conservation-related purposes
includes, but is not limited to access rights. Conservation advocates are learning
that they can “rent” the private property of owners whose property can serve as
vehicles for conservation of resources—asking the owners to aid and abet
conservation by both restraint and commission.26 “Using the Airbnb Model to
Protect the Environment” was the eye-catching title for a December 2017 article in
the New York Times describing this phenomenon.27 Sometimes, for example, they
might figuratively “rent” the land as if it were an Airbnb, asking a farmer not to cut
forests; or, they might pay to enlist the owner in activities that generate species
assistance, such as by paying for the creation of wetlands along migratory bird
paths.28 All of these show a willingness for conservation-minded individuals to
embrace sharing economy ideas and market solutions when they are presented, and
an increasing willingness to innovate with market mechanisms in mind as means
for achieving ends often perceived as reachable only by command and control.
Turning to access initiatives specifically, though, we see a number of
examples emerging where innovators are finding ways to coordinate agreements
through market mechanisms between property owners and outsiders. Beyond
academia and progressive property scholars, activists and outdoor enthusiasts too
are pushing for greater recreational access rights—sometimes through government
mandates, sometimes through public/private cooperative approaches, and
sometimes through pure market bargaining. Some advocate a general right to
roam,29 while others take more targeted approaches. The Surfrider Foundation,30

26. Seema Jayachandran, Using the Airbnb Model to Protect the Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/business/economy/airbnb-protect-environment.html
(describing “market-based” strategies to “rent” protected land during periods when migratory birds need
it most for safe passage or when threatened species need it for breeding; including, for example, paying
rice farmers to flood their fields when they might otherwise be dry—or to make payments to individuals
willing to make conservation efforts, such as to farmers who agree to refrain from cutting in certain
forests.).
27. Id.
28. Jonathan Wood, Sharing Economy Conservation: Why Technology Solves Complex
Environmental Problems Better than Regulation, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.perc.org/2018/02/15/sharing-economy-conservation-technology-solves-complexenvironmental-problems-better-regulation/ (describing how technology is making conservation efforts
more accessible and efficient, including explaining how the sharing economy model has worked for the
Nature Conservancy’s migratory bird creation of “pop-up wetlands” and the use of smart phones to
crowd source for information on where the birds are sighted to know what areas to “rent” or make
payments to flood).
29. See, e.g., KEN ILGUNAS, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: HOW WE LOST THE RIGHT TO ROAM AND
HOW TO TAKE IT BACK (2018); KEN ILGUNAS, TRESPASSING ACROSS AMERICA 117-121 (2016).
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for example, has campaigns advocating and obtaining enlarged coastal access
including across private lands in addition to its agenda for preserving ocean and
coastal quality.31 Similarly, there are a number of examples of innovative projects
to assemble trail networks where private organizations act as intermediaries.32
Byron Kahr, for instance, explains that West Virginia’s “Hatfield-McCoy system of
ORV [off-road vehicles] trails and open riding areas represents the most successful
assemblage of ORV riding opportunities on private lands.”33 He also highlights the
arrangement in Vermont where there is a “public-private hybrid approach” in
which the non-profit Vermont Association of Snow Travelers “administers the
snowmobile routes in the state, eighty percent of which cross over private land.”34
Each of these programs demonstrates that assembly of trails across multiple
properties is possible, despite potential anti-commons and transaction cost
concerns.
Shawn Regan at the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC)
explains that sharing economy technology is already starting on a small scale to
facilitate greater outsider access to private Western lands.35 With a push, and so
long as there truly is a demand for roaming rights, we should assume that these
technologies could be applied on a broad scale to accomplish the type of market to
roam envisioned in this article.
Regan aptly notes that the “challenge is to build a platform that creates
trust between users,” just as we see with Uber, Airbnb, and the like.36 He outlines

30. Beach Access, SURFRIDER FOUND., https://www.surfrider.org/initiatives/beach-access (last
visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“Surfrider Foundation works with decision-making bodies to evaluate each beach
access issue that arises. We also pursue litigation to ensure full and fair access to all beaches, for all
people[,] . . actively fighting for beach access in places where private property owners have cut off longstanding publicly used coastal access.”); see also Policy on Beach Access, SURFRIDER FOUND.,
https://www.surfrider.org/pages/policy-on-beach-access (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“Whereas, Surfrider
Foundation views beach access as a universal right. Surfrider Foundation works to secure universal,
low-impact beach access for all people. Surfrider Foundation’s members live, work, visit, and recreate
on and near the world’s beaches, and are impacted by beach access limitations.”).
31. See Ilgunas, supra note 12 (“The Surfrider Foundation, a nonprofit that advocates better beach
access, reports that several states, including Maine, Massachusetts and Virginia, have favored the
interests of beachfront property owners by limiting public access to shorelines. Hawaii and Oregon, on
the other hand, have granted generous public access to their coasts.”).
32. Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 977-78
(2013) (“It is harder to dismiss the complaint that private organizations can (and do) play the role of
intermediary. For example, hunters form clubs that lease hunting land, and hikers form organizations
that create trails.”) (citing, inter alia, Ian Munn et al., Hunter Preferences and Willingness to Pay for
Hunting Leases, 57 FOREST SCI. 189 (2011), http:// www.afoa.org/PDF/CI1107b.pdf); Our Strategic
Plan, RIVANNA TRAILS FOUND., http:// www.rivannatrails.org/Default.aspx?pageId=952616
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150216174739/http://www.rivannatrails.org/page-952616] (describing a
21-mile loop trail network created in Charlottesville, VA).
33. Byron Kahr, The Right to Exclude Meets the Right to Ride: Private Property, Public
Recreation, and the Rise of Off-Road Vehicles, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 102 (2009).
34. Id. at 103.
35. Shawn Regan, Bringing the Sharing Economy to Private Land, PERC REP. 39, (2015),
https://www.perc.org/wpcontent/uploads/old/pdfs/Bringing%20the%20Sharing%20Economy%20to%20Private%20Land_Regan
_0.pdf.
36. Id.
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the type of technological extension that would be necessary to accomplish all sorts
of access to private lands:
Imagine if, with a few taps on your smartphone, you could rent
access to a local property, book a fishing pass to a neighbor’s
spring creek, or lease short-term hunting access on a nearby
ranch. Landowners could enroll, define certain conditions and
limits, and gain assurances that their property would be
respected. In the process, they could diversify their incomes and
have greater incentives to conserve their land.37
Regan provides examples of private platforms and associated apps in areas
like land sharing for camping access and hunting.38 Through “Airbnb-like
websites,”39 companies like Land-Apart,40 Hipcamp,41 and Tentrr42 connect
campers with private lands where they can set up camp and allows owners to list
their properties as available to share with campers. Rod, Gun, and Bow is a new
company that touts its brand of matching hunters with leasing opportunities on
private lands as “Your land-sharing matchmaker.”43 South Park Fly Fishers is an
example of a platform connecting fly fishermen with fly fishing experiences on
“premier Colorado ranches.”44 Whether it be a room in your house or a route across
your backyard, similar principles apply. It is not hard to envision, with the right

37. Id.
38. Id. (describing companies called “Hipcamp” and “Rod, Gun, and Bow”).
39. Sarah Gilman, Private-land Camping Startups Offer Alternative to Public Lands: Airbnb-like
Websites Spring up in Response to Overcrowded Public Campsites, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, (July 20,
2015),
https://www.hcn.org/issues/47.12/private-land-camping-startups-offer-alternative-to-publiclands.
40. LANDAPART THE LAND SHARING PROGRAM, https://www.landapart.com/home (last visited
Sept. 7, 2018) (website explains that: “Landowners share their lands. You book and enjoy them. Ramble
responsibly.”).
41. HIPCAMP, https://www.hipcamp.com/about#our-story (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) ((website
proclaims service as a way to “Find Yourself Outside;” and, “Hipcamp is everywhere you want to camp.
Search, discover and book ranches, farms, vineyards, nature preserves & public sites for camping across
the U.S.”). Hipcamp explains it services as follows: “Our overall mission is to get more people outside
and, more specifically, to inspire the next generation of people who are passionate about exploring AND
protecting our lands. Spending time outdoors has proven health benefits and fosters a deeper connection
to the awesome, wild world out there. And we’re firm believers that people will only protect what they
connect to and care about. Getting more people outside really starts with access; access to land, but also
to information about that land. We don’t think finding somewhere to camp should be such a timeconsuming, convoluted and confusing process, which is why we started Hipcamp. We are committed to
making getting outside fun, easy, and as simple as selecting what, when and where you want your
camping experience to be. Need a campsite by the beach next weekend where you can bring your dog?
We got you!).”
42. For the home page for Tentrr, see https://www.tentrr.com/. In their promotional materials,
Tentrr represents explains: “We aim to take the hassle out of camping so that you can enjoy your time
outdoors. We connect landowners with campers seeking to explore the great outdoors.” See
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2r6MJ-48U0 (Tag line associated with Tentrr promotional video).
43. ROD GUN AND BOW LLC, https://rodgunandbowllc.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2018).
44. SOUTH PARK FLY FISHERS, https://www.southparktrout.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).

Winter 2019

THE MARKET TO ROAM

101

technical support, a business model that launches a market to roam. If you build it,
they will roam.
While some companies have emerged to offer their assembly services and
sub-licensing of trail access,45 the same is also accomplished by organizations of
like-minded recreationists. For example, in late December 2017, the Idaho State
Snowmobile Association announced that it “has carved out a deal with a company
owned by two Texas billionaires to groom trails on a portion of their private land
near New Meadows, allowing access . . . for snowmobilers to forest and state lands
otherwise blocked by the Wilkses’ property.”46 Likewise, Peter Kenlan describes
one example of a cooperative access agreement where “private groups [who] have
taken the initiative to develop relationships with landowners to secure access,” such
as the Maine Snowmobile Association’s umbrella oversight of a variety of local
clubs’ bargained-for “network of 14,000 miles of trails, 95% of which are on
private property.”47 Momentum is definitely building to find innovative ways to
match access demands with access supply, and the market is already generating
products that capitalize on individual preferences for greater and more flexible
recreational access.
B.

Limited Supply by Governmental Products and the Push for More

Evidence of demand for access rights is also revealed by examining
existing statutes, governmental programs, and legal definitions of the scope of
property rights that already attempt to generate access or limit rights of exclusion.
In other words, exclusion is not absolute under the law and does not even start as
the default assumption of rights’ assignment in all instances. Mandated access
rights are not unknown in the United States. Public beaches, traditional Native
American sites, and other limited areas trigger the imposition of implied rights of
access.48 In many states, unenclosed private property is open to certain recreational
activities unless the private property owner clearly “opts out” by excluding

45. Kahr, supra note 33, at 102.
46. Rocky Barker, Texas Billionaires Open Up Some Land Access, let Idaho Snowmobilers Groom
STATESMAN,
Dec.
19,
2017,
Trails,
IDAHO
http://www.idahostatesman.com/outdoors/recreation/article190549684.html.
47. Peter H. Kenlan, Comment, Maine’s Open Lands: Public Use of Private Land, the Right to
Roam, and the Right to Exclude, 68 ME. L. REV. 185, 193 (2016).
48. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (N.J. 1984). For a
sampling of articles discussing actual or proposed specialized public access rights in the United States,
see also Darla J. Mondou, The American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act: Does the
Winters Water Bucket Have a Hole In It?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 381 (1998); Mary Christina Wood, The
Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part II): Asserting a Sovereign Servitude to Protect Habitat
of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355 (2001); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to
Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005);
Claudia Braymer, Comment, Improving Public Access to the Adirondack Forest Preserve, 72 ALB. L.
REV. 293 (2009); Becky Lundberg Witt, Towards a Human Right to Food: Implications for Urban
Growing in Baltimore City, Maryland, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405 (2016); Alfred L. Brophy, Property
and Progress: Antebellum Landscape Art and Property Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 603 (2009);
Hamilton, supra note 5; Kahr, supra note 33; Kenlan, supra note 47.
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individuals, such as through “no trespassing” postings and fencing.49 Given that
many advocates are still pushing for a mandated right to roam, it seems they must
find existing programs insufficient for achieving access. Advocates for marketbased approach to roaming will find current governmental programs either
unsupporting of, or perhaps even interfering with, the creation of market-based
roaming approaches. Nonetheless, the existing legal standards and programs
discussed below are something that reforms designed to generate more roaming
access must deal with—building upon them or remodeling around or through them.
This article can only begin to provide some examples of such existing access
measures, but should help develop a basic understanding of the present nature of
access rights more generally.
First among the legal regimes facilitating access are “posting” laws. A
number of states have laws that allow the public to access unenclosed but private
lands for “recreational purposes” (with varying definitions of what constitutes
“recreation”)50 unless and until the private property owners “post” markings
asserting their rights to exclude (such as fencing, no trespassing signs, designated
paint signals regarding borders and owner assertion of exclusion rights, etc.). Put
another way, in many states the failure to post creates an implied permission to the
public to recreational access across private lands.51 Depending on the state, this
requirement that property owners must opt to expressly assert their exclusion rights
before they may seek full enforcement of those exclusion rights varies in scope and
application.52
For example, the failure to post exclusion notices may affect the
designation of trespass and the immunization of intruders under criminal trespass,
civil trespass, or both. In Maine, for example, there is an understanding of the
concept of “permissive trespass.”53 As another example, California makes posting
necessary to give notice before holding one liable for criminal trespass.54
The access rights granted by states are often associated with rights to
travel or access to public resources (like water and wildlife) that exist on private
land. For example, South Dakota has a complex system of open access and hunting
rights along section lines even across private property.55 In most states, the use of

49. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner’s Liability for
Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R. 4th 262 (1986).
50. Id. See also generally Kahr, supra note 33; Kenlan, supra note 47 (surveys of the recreational
use statutes across jurisdictions).
51. See, e.g., Kenlan, supra note 47, at 195 (citation omitted) (describing the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court’s view of permissive use: “Maine has a tradition of acquiescence in access to nonposted
fields and woodlands by abutters and by the public. Pursuant to our open lands tradition, recreational use
of unposted open fields or woodlands and any ways through them are presumed permissive[.]”).
52. Kahr, supra note 33, at 83 (“State statutes requiring posting on unenclosed land in order to
trigger criminal trespass violations are common, although they are not uniform in form or in wording.”).
53. See, e.g., Kenlan, supra note 47, at 192-93, 196-98 (describing the diversity of access
protections throughout Maine under permissive trespass doctrines in unposted areas).
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (West 2008) (“no trespassing” signs required and must be
regularly and conspicuously placed).
55. Tom Simmons, Comment, Highways, Hunters and Section Lines: Tensions Between Public
Access and Private Rights, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 240 (1997) (describing the open public
access and hunting rights along section lines and their relationship with R.S. 2477 federal rights of way).
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navigable waterways often trumps private owners’ rights to exclude as well,
because of their inherent service value to the public and its enjoyment of public
resources.56
With certain rights like hunting, some states go beyond the opt-in posting
requirement and grant hunters positive rights to hunt on unenclosed lands even in
the face of postings or other efforts by the private landowners to exclude them.57
For example, Kenlan describes this outcome in South Carolina by judicial
interpretation58 and in Vermont by constitutional decree.59 Other states treat
hunting access as special and start from a default rule that hunters shall have rights
of access, but nonetheless give property owners opportunities to assert certain
exclusion rights.60 Anderson summarizes the “posting” rules for hunting across the
states and their effects:
State statutes in the United States governing public access to private land
focus mainly on hunting rights. About half of the states have enacted “posting”
rules, which generally allow access to private land for hunting, without the
landowner’s specific permission, unless the land has been posted with “no
trespassing” signs. The other states require hunters to obtain permission from
landowners before hunting and do not require posting. In at least some of these
states, the statutory requirement of posting to prohibit access could apply to
recreational access as well as to hunting, which would allow a hiker to presume
permission to walk across unposted lands. In most of the states that require posting,
however, hunting is given a preferred status over public access for other purposes.61
Hunting’s preferred status makes it a unique category of access, but the
government response to that demand shows that statutes that require property
owners to allow access—by coercive adjustment of rights rather than consensual
agreement—are not unknown in the United States. Some individuals are able to
gain inclusion rights outside of bargaining.
Government programs like hunting access statutes—where the
government facilitates the matching of demanding-hunters with landowners willing
to provide access—are interesting examples of state-led facilitation and

56. See Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, 53 N.E.3d 730 (N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted)
(recognizing public easements for waters that are navigable in fact and that “provide practical utility to
the public as a means for transportation, whether for trade or travel”). See also generally Maureen E.
Brady, Defining “Navigability”: Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Waterways, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2015) (discussing the rules of public access to navigable waterways).
57. See Kenlan, supra note 47, at 190.
58. See, e.g., id. (citation omitted) (explaining a case from South Carolina where “the state supreme
court refused to find a hunter liable for trespass when the hunter openly defied the landowner’s order to
keep off” because of “the hunter’s positive right to hunt on unenclosed land.”).
59. Id. (“In Vermont, the state’s constitution specifically protects” a hunter’s right to access
unenclosed land.); VT. CONST. CH. II, § 67 (“The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable
times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not inclosed, and in like manner to
fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and
provided by the General Assembly.”).
60. Kahr, supra note 33, at 84 (“Many states have adopted specific trespass rules with respect to
hunters entering private land, and generally, such statutes require landowners to take specific affirmative
steps to keep hunters off of their land.”).
61. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 422.
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coordination between property owners and groups of strangers interested in
accessing property. For example, Montana’s block management program (“BMP”)
creates a coordinated system that allows hunters to hunt on multiple landowners’
properties through a single bi-lateral registration system.62 Hunters who register are
allowed to access and remove game from private property without burdensome
individualized negotiation, provided certain use restrictions negotiated between the
landowner and the Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks department are satisfied.63
Kahr describes a similar program in Kansas which he argues—while advocating for
its use as a potential model for greater ORV access—represents “a successful
approach to balancing the interests of private landowners and hunters seeking
access to open lands.”64 Kansas’s “‘Walk-In Hunting Access Program,’ . . . has
enrolled over one million acres of private land across the state, resulting in a steep
increase in available hunting opportunities.”65 The program starts with an
exclusion-based default and offers incentives for property owners to choose to
grant permission.66 Further the Kansas program “operat[es]with the presumption
that lands are off-limits to hunters until a landowner affirmatively opts into the
program.”67 The state continues its role as facilitator by providing maps and
information “documenting all available private lands” thus helping licensed hunters
overcome barriers they might face in identifying willing owners.68 While each of
these examples of government coordinated programs show the possibility of such
measures to increase public access, Professor Neil Hamilton, an agricultural law
professor who has studied various natural resource access issues, especially in rural
areas, notes that “there are only limited examples of coordinated programs to
promote public use of private land.”69
Other types of access fall into a category that might be called “government
administered” rather than “government-coordinated.” For example, as a result of
the 2014 Farm Bill, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resource
Conservation Service administers the Voluntary Public Access and Habitat
Incentive Program (VPA-HIP), which “is a competitive grants program that helps
state and tribal governments increase public access to private lands for wildlifedependent recreation, such as hunting, fishing, nature watching or hiking.”70 As the
program description continues, “State and tribal governments may submit
proposals for VPA-HIP block grants from NRCS. These governments provide the
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-266 (2011).
63. Id.; see also State v. McGregor, 398 P.3d 241 (Mont. 2017) (holding individual liable for
trespass for hunting on private land without obtaining permission by complying with Block
Management Area procedures).
64. Kahr, supra note 33, at 101.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 101-102 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 101.
68. Id. (“Licensed hunters receive maps from the state documenting all available private lands, thus
reducing the informational burden on both hunters and landowners for determining where hunting is
permitted.”) (citations omitted).
69. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 200.
70. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2014 Farm Bill- Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive
Program- NCRS, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/farmbill/?cid=
stelprdb1242739.
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funds to participating private landowners to initiate new or expand existing public
access programs that enhance public access to areas previously unavailable for
wildlife-dependent recreation.”71 Administering payments to change private
landowner behavior is one way to attempt to accomplish public policy goals.
However, it is a far more complicated and bureaucratic means as compared to
facilitating private bargaining by embracing broader markets for access.
But some of the features of these government programs could provide
lessons for engineers of access markets. Policymakers should examine these and
similar arrangements to consider whether parts of their structures and incentives
could serve as inputs for developing a market to roam. Especially helpful could be
those programs that coordinate property owners opting-in, with those seeking
access using a centralized registration and information repository for obtaining
permissions. Platforms in a market to roam might serve similar centralized and
transaction cost-reducing functions. Roamers and property owners could arrange
for contracts, licenses, or property rights exchanges that grant access and roaming
privileges through third party platforms which manage the exchange.
IV.

RESTRICTING THE OPERATION OF THE RIGHT TO
EXCLUDE: PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY THEORY
AND MANDATED ACCESS FOR ROAMING

Our property system involved legislative and judicially-imposed
limitations on the right to exclude to facilitate certain competing policies,72
including to serve “human values” (like access to services for migrant farm
workers in the famous opinion in the State v. Shack case).73 Many of these policies
lead to limited, mandated access rights for particular purposes. But broad-scale
access rights generally—and broad-scale roaming rights particularly—have not
been mandated in the United States. In contrast, several countries have recently
made the choice to legislate rights to roam that mandate access and limit private
property owners’ rights to exclude.74 Recently, such statutes granting rights to
access and to roam across private property have been popping up in jurisdictions
around the globe, particularly in Europe.75 Generally speaking, these statutes seek
to prevent individual property owners from denying access to or otherwise
excluding those who want to roam across their property, provided the roaming
meets certain conditions and the roamer abides by certain rules.76 This compelled
inclusion has been heralded by progressive property scholars and mandatedroaming advocates as an example of sound public policy to reshape the property
system toward social obligations with inclusion norms. Furthermore, it proves that

71. Id.
72. See supra Part III.
73. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values. They are
recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”).
74. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 856 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the basics of the
right to roam and recent scholarship on the same).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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the right to exclude is not necessary for a well-functioning system of property
ownership.77
Within progressive property theory, exclusion norms are characterized as
furthering a vision of property that is atomistic, monopolistic, and isolationist.
Roaming, however, is often romanticized as the exercise of natural liberty where
wandering is the “essence of empowerment”78 for which fences and boundaries are
impediments.
A number of European statutes have been cited by American progressive
property scholars as models that could be used to increase roaming rights in the
United States by governmental mandate. For example, the Countryside and Rights
of Way Act of 2000 (“CRWA”) in Great Britain is relatively recent legislation
developing statutory rights to roam consistent with the progressive property
platform.79 Professor Jerry Anderson—whose scholarship has been influential in
identifying the connection between progressive property theory and roaming
rights—explains what is happening with the CRWA:
Britain’s recent enactment of a “right to roam” in the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000 [CRWA] provides a fascinating study of how the right to
exclude may be modified to accommodate public needs without unduly impacting
the interests of the private landowner. [CRWA] classifies private land that contains
mountains, moors, heath, or downland as “open country,” and requires landowners
to allow the public to roam freely across these lands. Thus, [CRWA] opens up
millions of acres of private land to public access, without compensating the
landowners for this limitation on their right to exclude. As a result, the law
represents a dramatic shift in the allocation of the bundle of sticks.80
One of the ways that the CRWA (and many of the European roaming
initiatives) can be distinguished from roaming reform movements in the United
States is in its effort to repair past acts perceived as wrongs. The CRWA is

77. Ilgunas, supra note 12 (“our understanding of property and our unquestioned devotion to the
right to exclude may need to be reconsidered in an age when America is increasingly characterized by
growing populations, sprawling cities and suburbs, and far less green space.”).
78. See, e.g., Gil Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455, 488 n.212
(2003). Grantmore provides the following sources on the purposes of roaming and wandering:”Real
liberty lies in wandering.” Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). This popular slogan, which adorns many travel posters in France and Québec, appears to be
derived from the following passage by Isabelle Eberhardt: “Un droit que bien peu d’intellectuels se
soucient de revendiquer, c’est le droit à l’errance, au vagabondage. Et pourtant, le vagabondage, c’est
l’affranchissement, et la vie le long des routes, c’est la liberté.” 1 Isabelle Eberhardt, Écrits sur le Sable
27 (Marie-Odile Delacour & Jean-René Huleu eds., 1988). Herewith a freely rendered English
translation: “A right that very few intellectuals bother to demand is the right to roam, to wander. Yet
wandering is the essence of empowerment, and the life of the road is liberty itself.” Id. See also
Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 378 (discussing Britain’s CRWA against the
backdrop of the “romantic vision of a rural walk [as] enshrined in English literature”).
79. Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37 (U.K.).
80. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 377-78; see also Anderson, Comparative
Perspectives, supra note 6, at 546-50; Federico Cheever, British National Parks for North Americans:
What We Can Learn from a More Crowded Nation Proud of Its Countryside, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247
(2007); Jess Kyle, Of Constitutions and Cultures: The British Right to Roam and American Property
Law, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10898 (2014).
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designed to restore general rights to roam that were claimed to have existed in the
past, but that have been extinguished by enclosure orders.81
Sweden, too, has developed limits on landowners’ exclusion rights.82
Cornell Law Dean Eduardo Peñalver describes this as “the so-called allemansrätt,
or ‘everyman’s right’ to roam over the countryside in ways that do not damage the
land, intrude on privacy, or interfere with the uses to which the owner has chosen
to put her land.”83
Another example of roaming laws in Europe is the Land Reform
(Scotland) Act of 2003. Professor John Lovett has identified its fit with the goals of
“progressive theorists” of property law—a camp he identifies as “those scholars
who call for American property law to embrace a social obligation norm aiming to
maximize human flourishing at all times and who welcome a more contextualized
property law decision making process focused on producing relationships of
dignity, fairness, and respect.”84 Lovett continues by explaining why these scholars
are supportive of efforts to create greater protections for roaming rights:
These “progressive” or “social obligation” theorists picture individuals,
and by extension property owners, as fundamentally dependent on human
community. In moments of conflict, this interdependence requires property law
decision makers to determine whether a property owner’s interest in autonomy and
control over her asset must be sacrificed, sometimes without compensation or strict
reciprocity, to satisfy a non-owner’s need for access to that asset or the
community’s interest in control over use or disposition of that asset.85
Professor Gregory Alexander provides similar sentiments in his own
history of Scotland’s traditions regarding roaming and its modern right to roam
under the 2003 Scottish Land Reform Act.86 Alexander explains that roaming rights
contribute to a “socially democratic culture.”87 Although sympathetic to the idea of
roaming rights for this and other progressive reasons, Alexander cautions that “the
point must not be pushed too far, for under some circumstances shared public
spaces can be sites of social divisions.”88
Lovett’s study was prescriptive as well, outlining a framework for
transforming our exclusion-centric property law regime in the United States.89

81. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 378-79.
82. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:15 (Swed.) http://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/
07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf; see generally Kevin T. Colby, Public
Access to Private Land—Allemansrätt in Sweden, 15 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 253 (2015) (explaining
why “Allemansrätt is an example of land ‘ownership’ of a different kind”).
83. Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 206 n.60 (2010).
84. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 742-43; accord. John A. Lovett, The Right to
Exclude Meets the Right of Responsible Access, 26 PROB. & PROP. 52 (2012) (surveying developments
in European roaming laws); Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 665 (2011).
85. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 744-45.
86. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003 (A.S.P. 2).
87. Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and the Historical Origins of the
Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 321, 323 (2016).
88. Id.
89. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 816-17.
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Lovett concludes his work by explaining what such a transformation would mean
and the values he hopes it could accomplish:
[I]t is practically possible for a modern, democratic nation
committed to the rule of law, the protection of private property,
and open markets to create, if it wants, a property regime that to a
considerable extent replaces the ex ante presumption in favor of
the right to exclude that has come to be taken for granted in the
United States with an equally robust, but rebuttable, ex ante
presumption in favor of access.90
Lovett describes his project as demonstrating that “it is possible to create a
property access regime that does not depend on further boundary drawing and a
narrow conception of the access rights that the public might enjoy on private
land.”91 The Scottish roaming rights example, he contends, proves the viability of
establishing a legal regime that is “open-ended in texture and that aims to inspire a
new relationship between landowner and non-owner access takers, a relationship
based on mutual respect for the rights of the other,” and that “can, despite some
unavoidable uncertainty costs, incorporate and seek to inspire virtues of
responsibility, humility, and mutual regard.”92 Mandated roaming rights are
intended to serve a very bold agenda.
Of course, one must ask whether relationships can really be inspired when
they are forced. It may make more sense to encourage innovation that generates
consensual roaming exchanges which seem far more likely to develop relationships
between owner and roamer in a way that forced socialization cannot.
Anderson, for one, represents the views of progressive property scholars
in endorsing these types of legislation. He laments the absence of a right to roam as
a costly consequence of the American preference for an “absolute right to
exclude.”93 One of the goals that Anderson claims will be advanced in societies that
embrace a mandated right to roam is greater access to ecological resources, along
with enhanced means of transportation, mental health improvement, better physical
health, a connection to history and culture, and a more developed sense of
community.94 On the matter of breaking down property rights to provide ecological
amenities to the public, Anderson states:
Roaming rights and footpaths enable the walker to reach places that are
not yet spoiled by urban development, from which a road would detract. A hike
may lead to a beautiful vista, or a mountain stream, surrounded by natural beauty
unblemished by concrete and steel. Walking through the scenery, such as hiking on
a footpath through a meadow of grazing sheep, puts you in the middle of the
beauty, and makes you a part of it, rather than simply observing it through a car
window. The effect is therefore more like a three-dimensional image than a picture

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 379.
Id. at 413-17.
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postcard. Moreover, the slow pace allows for a more intimate observation of the
wildlife and plants that abound in the countryside.95
This idea of roaming as facilitating the connection with nature—said to be
cut off through owners’ rights to exclude—is a primary justification advanced for
the assertion of mandated roaming rights.96
When reading the dominant current literature on roaming, it mostly comes
from progressive property scholars who see great benefit in its proof “that the
composition of the bundle [of property rights] is not necessarily immutable, and
that changes may be desirable to better reflect contemporary society’s needs and
values.”97 As Anderson contends, “Britain’s right to roam represents a rather
dramatic re-allocation of one of the sticks in the property rights bundle from the
landowner to the public.”98 He continues, that “property rights must evolve and the
right to roam reminds us that, in the end, the recognition of the private owners’
rights involves a trade-off with public interests that should not be ignored.”99 This
progressive property agenda counsels that “the right to roam represents a welcome
return to a more interrelated, functional approach to property”100 that Americans
should consider embracing.101 Progressive property scholars’ policy position rests
on the idea that mandated roaming rights are just one of “numerous ways . . . to
allocate the bundle of sticks without abandoning the idea of private property in
general.”102 After all, Anderson claims, it is “possible to construct a strong
argument in favor of modifying the formalistic notion of an absolute right to
exclude.”103
The vast majority of the existing literature on roaming is supportive of the
statutory schemes that limit the right to exclude as a way to facilitate what the
advocates have identified as preferred social values of property. In other words,
most existing work on how to increase roaming access has trusted the government
as the mechanism for achieving more of it and all but ignored potential market
alternatives.
Moreover, there have been few scholars challenging the assumptions in
the mandates-based progressive property literature on roaming. Among these is
Professor Eric Claeys.104 One problematic claim in the pro-government roaming
literature, Claeys contends, is the assumption that owners must be forced to allow
roaming in order to realize the activity.105 Claeys challenges this by explaining

95. Id. at 413.
96. Of course, as later parts of this article will reveal, if it is the access that increases such a
connection, then there should be equal (or superior) benefits if the access can be accomplished through
alternative means—like with voluntary transfers of rights. See infra Part IX.
97. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 430.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ilgunas, supra note 12 (“If we want to create more safe and scenic walking spaces, we should
look to Europe’s roaming laws for ideas on opening up our countryside.”).
102. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 431.
103. Id.
104. Claeys, supra note 9, at 462-65.
105. Id.
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(while not advocating any proposal) that the government might choose to “buy or
condemn scenic paths” to achieve similar purposes without as much disruption on
traditional notions of property rights.106
Professors Jonathan Klick and Gideon Parchomovsky have used roaming
statutes as a way to quantify the value of the right to exclude by measuring the
devaluation of property when roaming interferes with an owner’s exclusion
rights.107 They provide a detailed history of the right to roam and a useful survey of
the literature on the right to exclude.108 While they caution that their work “should
not be interpreted as a flat-out rejection of the right to roam,”109 their findings
nonetheless show that the passage of the right to roam statutes in England and
Scotland have had a negative effect on real estate prices—even when these forced
rights to roam could be characterized as relatively “minor” invasions of the right to
exclude (because they were far less intrusive than contemplated alternatives).110
Their findings support the conclusion that owners and potential transferees do place
a value on the level of exclusion rights available as part of a particular ownership
package for a parcel.111
Thus, the progressive property scholarship demonstrates an existing
demand for more roaming rights yet seems to assume that a market with strong
exclusion norms is incapable of supplying it. This article’s primary hope is that the
sketch of a market to roam will open up that presumption to greater questioning.
Furthermore, the progressive property scholarship provides evidence of demand for
roaming rights—thereby supporting the conclusion that there may in fact be
customers for a market to roam if it emerges.
V.
THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AS
EMPOWERING INCLUSION AND ACCESS
The assumptions about exclusion that exist in progressive property theory
fail to capture the richness of the exclusion concept. Inclusion need not be coerced
and mandated at the expense of the right to exclusion. Indeed, protecting exclusion
is a way to empower an owner to supply even more opportunities for inclusion to
those who make marketplace demands for it.
Allowing stranger non-owners access to roam freely without prior
permission across private property seems antithetical to our intuitive notions of
what it means to own something. Norms have developed, at least in the United
States, that give us a sense of it being wrong to enter the property of another
106. Id. (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that mandated roaming rights are desirable. A government
could facilitate the same flourishing-related activities by buying or condemning scenic land and paths,
and converting them into parks or trails managed by the government or a public delegate.”).
107. See generally Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 10.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 922.
110. Id. at 961. See also Claeys, supra note 9, at 463 (discussing the Klick and Parchomovsky study
and summarizing that “there is at least some evidence that roaming rights chill land use. Swedish
farmers have had to confront roamers to stop them from picking crops, and other landowners have
complained that roaming rights have interfered with their opportunities to put their land to more active
uses.”).
111. Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 961.
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without permission.112 These intuitions are representative of an understanding that
the system of property is grounded in concepts like owners’ dominion and
control—the ability of those who own to regulate the ingress and egress across
their property. More technically, these notions are grounded in a right to exclude. If
we start from the proposition that exclusion is the default—admittedly something
that is disputed by some in the academic community—we can begin to see how
owners can subsequently enter into agreements and arrangements that further,
rather than impair, social relations with property.
The right to exclude serves important functions in ordering society and in
developing our relationships involving property. It is from exclusion that we can
understand the transfer of rights in property, the incentives to invest in property,
and the overall management of relationships between owners and outsiders to the
rights. The story of property rights is, in the end, a story about an ownership
package with exclusion as a critical element.
That ownership package is commonly described as the metaphorical
“bundle of sticks,” with each “stick” in “the bundle” representing some specific
attribute of such ownership.113 Professor Katheleen Guzman provides an excellent
description of what it means to have a stick in the bundle of property rights:
Legal theory divorces the term “property” from the item itself to instead
describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item. “Property” thus means things one can do
with Blackacre (entitlements) including its use, possession and consumption, as
well as enjoying its fruits, the ability to exclude others from its use, and the ability
to transfer it. Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights in one
person who then totes the full “bundle of sticks,” one may properly speak of
“owning” a lone entitlement or stick . . . Legally, the right itself is the property.114

112. See Donald J. Kochan, Playing with Real Property Inside Augmented Reality: Pokémon Go,
Trespass, and Law’s Limitations, 38 WHITTIER L. REV. 70, 94-100 (2018). See also ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 40-60 (Harvard Univ. Press
2009).
113. Grey’s formulation of the bundle is useful: “Most people, including most specialists in their
unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is
to have exclusive control over something – to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away,
leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived as departures
from an ideal conception of full ownership. By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the
modern specialist . . . fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy
‘bundle of rights.’”
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 69 (1980). See also Thomas Ross,
Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (1989) (“[t]he bundle metaphor . . . expresses a
special sense of the separability of the various sorts of legally recognized interests”).
114. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 615 (2000). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “A
common idiom describes property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in
certain combinations, constitute property.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 277 (2002) (citing
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) (reprint 2000) and Dickman v.
Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984)). See generally Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights
Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 57 (2013) (making the case for the utility of the
bundle of sticks metaphor for understanding many of the issues related to property in property law).
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The right to exclude—epitomized in the trespass cause of action—is
fundamental to the law of property.115 Trespass is grounded on these exclusion
rights held by property owners116 because it is a doctrine that defines the wrongs
committed when “one person physically invades the land of another.”117 A trespass
“consists of doing any of the following without lawful justification: (1) entering on
to land in the possession of another, (2) remaining on the land, or (3) placing or
projecting any object on it.”118 From all of these definitions, it should not be hard to
see that, normally, roaming on the land of another is just a kind way to describe a
trespassory act.
Trespass and other legal doctrines regularly recognize the right to exclude
because the law starts with the presumption that property owners can choose who
to include, when, and under what conditions.119 Such conditions might include
payment for access. When we fail to recognize the right to exclude, property
owners lose the ability to profit from such selling of access rights. Furthermore,
property owners may especially want to control stranger access because those
owners can sometimes be liable for actions taken by individuals on their property
or even liable to trespassers that get injured while on their property.
The Supreme Court has regularly given the “right to exclude” recognition
as fundamental to property.120 Property owners have a level of dominion and
control that allows them to manage property rights, including the power to exercise
the right to include which is an extension of the choice to not assert the right to
exclude. Owners may very well need to do certain things to protect their exclusive
borders—like post signs, fences, or other notices to others121—but, so long as they

115. EDWARD H. RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL & JEFFREY L. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN PROPERTY LAW 2 (5th ed. 2006) (“All theories of property recognize that the right to exclude
others is an important attribute of property.”); R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, JEROME M. ORGAN, ALICE M.
NOBLE-ALLGIRE, & JAMES L. WINOKUR, PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 7 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that
the right to exclude is a “unifying or necessary characteristic” of the “concept of property”).
116. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (“[T]hat is
property to which the following label can be attached. To the world: Keep off unless you have my
permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen. Endorsed: The state.”).
117. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 99 (5th ed. 2017).
118. Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For a discussion of trespass’s role in our
land use control system, see Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation
and Land Use Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 303, 306, 322-24
(2015).
119. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1987). See also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1-16,
938 (2d ed. 2012) (sections discussing trespass and chapter exploring the law governing “[t]he uses to
which neighboring property is put”).
120. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”).
See also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring) (“Property depends upon exclusion
by law from interference. . . . “); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude
others from enjoying it.”).
121. See generally Hynes, supra note 32.
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meet these hurdles, the general enforceability of exclusion is strong in the
American system.
The right to exclude, however, is more textured than the name implies.
Exclusion is what makes it possible to thereafter apportion parts of the rights in a
property to others. Included among the ancillary rights under the exclusion
umbrella is the inclusion right.122 A leading property textbook describes this
combination as “a relationship among people that entitles so-called owners to
include (that is, permit) or exclude (that is, deny) use or possession of the owned
property by other people.”123
Professor Daniel Kelly’s research catalogs the ubiquity of the right to
include within property law, and he concludes, “The ability of owners to ‘include’
others in their property is a central attribute of ownership and fundamental to any
system of private property.”124 This ability to include makes possible mutually
beneficial exchanges—owners are willing to respond to demand from friends and
strangers alike who are willing to offer something of value as consideration in
exchange for being allowed to access the owner’s property.
Exclusion rights themselves allow owners to thereafter apportion rights
within the thing we call property, including land. Among available ways to
apportion property are the splitting of interests, formally or informally, and this
right to include others in the use and enjoyment of the property. Consequently, it
follows that from the greater right to exclude, control entry, and forbid all others
comes the lesser right to include—which involves the decision to choose not to
enforce one’s right to exclude to its fullest extent and to instead permit access.
Inclusion is about allowing access and sharing one’s ownership with
others.125 If one owns property, then they control access to it. They have the ability
to permit roaming precisely because they have the power to prohibit it.126
Fundamental principles of property law supporting inclusion and sharing127
underlay the obvious point that property owners can choose to include roamers. If
owners transfer rights of access to roamers, then the sharing of these access rights
becomes simply an extension of one’s ability to use and control the property one

122. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 104.
123. Id.
124. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see generally Donald J.
Kochan, Property as a Vehicle of Inclusion to Promote Human Sociability, JOTWELL (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://property.jotwell.com/property-as-a-vehicle-of-inclusion-to-promote-human-sociability (reviewing
Kelly).
125. Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 933 (2017) (“[T]he
sharing right [is] an outgrowth of the inclusion right, which itself grows out of the exclusion right held
by property owners.”).
126. Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 127 (2001) (“The separation
of the legal interests in property from the physical object possessed has enabled us to constantly modify
the set of property rights that constitutes ‘ownership’ of land (or anything else).”).
127. James E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 745
(1996) (“The ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, is fundamental in the idea of
property.”).
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owns.128 That is why “[t]he two rights [to exclude and to include] are the necessary
and sufficient conditions of transferability.”129 The inclusion stick and its offshoots
allowing the granting of access rights empower owners to permit non-owners to
access and use their property, including through mechanisms like roaming.130
VI.
FACILITATING INCLUSION: LESSONS FROM
THE SHARING ECONOMY AND THE UTILITY OF
EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL PLATFORMS
“Sharing” as used in the “sharing economy” context generally means that
assets or services—like one’s home in the homesharing market or one’s fields in a
roaming market—are allowed to be accessed, possessed, used or consumed by
someone other than the property owner (or, in other contexts, the provider of the
services).131 The sub-markets already emerging in the sharing economy provide a
blueprint for countless new ways to match demand with heretofore unknown
supply. The sharing economy offers several models which should be studied to
execute the creation of a market to roam. What Uber, Airbnb, and the like have
done is contribute to the proof of concept for the right to roam. Knowledge of the
existence of demand for a market to roam supports the belief that there should be
incentives for entrepreneurial platform operators to begin building the market
mechanisms that can allow the market to come into being.
Sharing in the sharing economy has taken off due to new market forces
and technology that solve coordination and information problems.132 As Lobel
documents, platforms facilitate sharing exchanges utilizing a variety of
technological means of low transaction cost connections, facilitation of access to
information between market participants, and reputation tracking to inject reliable

128. Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why People
Participate in Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH., 2047, 2049 (2015) (“Access
over ownership means that users may offer and share their goods and services to other users for a
limited time through peer-to-peer sharing activities, such as renting and lending.”), (citing Fleura Bardhi
& Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES.
881, 882-83 (2012)).
129. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 104.
130. Kelly, supra note 124, at 871-72.
131. As I have summarized elsewhere: “[P]roperty that is shared in this sector is used or accessed
rather than owned; the transfer of possession to facilitate such use or access is temporary rather than
permanent and involves something less than granting an ownership share; ownership is retained the
entire time by the sharer; and the sharer has an enforceable expectation for a return of any property and
the cessation of use at a pre-determined future point in time.” Kochan, supra note 125, at 931; see also
Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shareddefinition (describing the
sharing economy as an “economic model based on sharing underutilized assets . . . for monetary or nonmonetary benefits.”).
132. See, e.g., John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and Renting: Some Simple
Economics of the “Sharing Economy” 1 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP 16-007, 2016),
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1307 (“In recent years, technology startup
firms have created a new kind of rental market, in which owners sometimes use their assets for personal
consumption and sometimes rent them out. Such markets are referred to as peer-to-peer or ‘sharing
economy’ markets.”).
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and confirmable trust ratings into the process.133 She explains that a “new wave of
start-ups, relying on digital platform technology, are connecting people and
transforming behavior and relationships outside of the digital world, tapping into
underutilized human, social, and real capital. This new economy dramatically
extends the lifecycle of products, shortens time of use, and exponentially expands
connectivity and access.”134 There are individuals who lack access to property and
goods (like people without homes, people without cars, people who previously
used taxi cabs to get around or hotels to stay while on vacation, or hikers without
land of their own upon which to roam) and later become consumers who demand
alternative means of access to such property and goods. As such, business
innovators are generating new platforms to facilitate collaborative, access-based
consumption.135
Sharing platforms are flexible products of innovation that are increasingly
being repurposed for new applications.136 The success of the sharing economy is
largely credited to new technologies, making new collaborations, connections, and
exchanges feasible.137 As transaction costs decrease, more sharing agreements
become attractive alternatives for achieving preferences.138 The literature on the
sharing economy is already substantial,139 and it need not be replicated here. What
133. Lobel, supra note 21, at 106-07.
134. Id. at 89.
135. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative
Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015) (explaining “collaborative consumption” and “peerto-peer” as alternative labels to describe “the sharing economy”); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can
Sharing be Taxed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 991 (2016) (“Also known as “collaborative consumption,”
the “peer-to-peer economy” or “peer-to-peer consumption,” a broad range of commentators suggest that
the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume and supply goods and services, such as
transportation, accommodations, and task help.”); Hamari, supra note 128, at 2049 (“We define the term
CC broadly as the peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and
services, coordinated through community-based online services.”); Miller, supra note 14, at 150
(describing alternative names including “collaborative consumption” and “access-based consumption”).
136. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1458 (2016) (“The
P2P economy” is an innovative social transformation that “entrenches and intensifies existing economic
and social practices and approaches.”).
137. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 536 (2016) (explaining how many
sharing economy activities “have only become possible on a large scale because of relatively new
technology, such as GPS, smartphones, and app software.”); Georgios Zervas, David Proserpio & John
W. Byers, The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 2
(B.U. Sch. Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 (The
emergence of multi-sided technology platforms, “collectively known as the ‘sharing economy’, has
enabled individuals to collaboratively make use of under-utilized inventory via fee-based sharing.”).
138. Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing
Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69, 70 (2015); see also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption
Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 77 (2015) (discussing how “new technologies
and online markets have significantly lowered transaction costs for short term use of personal assets.”
(footnote omitted)).
139. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: HOW COLLABORATIVE
CONSUMPTION IS CHANGING THE WAY WE LIVE 67-96 (2010); Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca,
The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016); John Infranca,
Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016); Miller,
supra note 14; Zale, supra note 137, at 502-03 (“The sharing economy—the rapidly evolving sector of
peer-to-peer transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is nothing if not controversial.”); Dyal-
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we know is that “[s]haring is no longer an idiosyncratic pursuit; it is now a
mainstream manner of consumption.”140
Economists explain that sharing arrangements make sense when
individuals can make resources, which have not been used to their greatest
potential, more active and accessible.141 With roaming, for example, there is land
that need not be constantly occupied by its owners. And passage through or across
one’s own land constitutes an asset of the land that is undoubtedly underutilized.
Economic researchers Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell and Adam Thierer
describe “the sharing economy as any marketplace that brings together distributed
networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise underutilized assets.”142
Sharers are owners with assets that could generate a profit without interfering with
the owner’s present use,143 and sharees are those who do not own but could benefit
from the access that would otherwise be unavailable to them as non-owners of that
asset.144
In previous work, I have proposed the following definition for “sharing”
in the sharing economy:
Sharing of a good or real property exists when Owner (O)
exercises her right to include by authorizing a Stranger to the
property (S) the temporary right to use or access O’s property in
some limited and defined manner—converting what would have
been a trespassory act by S into a legal, non-trespassory act—
where such authorization is revocable by O in property law but
where liability may exist in contract for any such revocation or
interference by O in the rights or authority granted by O to S.145
The explanation is particularly sensitive to the ideas that (1) property
owners are sharing things they own, (2) are doing so precisely because they have
the power to do so as owners, because (3) they own a sharing stick in their bundle
of property rights. Owners can choose to share but also set the terms of the sharing
arrangement, including charging a fee for the privilege of conditional or full access
or offering it for free but with use conditions. The owner is exercising her right to
include another in the access and benefits of her property.

Chand, supra note 135; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing
Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531 (2015); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 138; Rashmi Dyal-Chand,
Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647 (2013); Aloni, supra note 136.
140. Miller, supra note 14, at 201.
141. See generally, e.g., Koopman, supra note 139; Zeravs, supra note 137.
142. Koopman, supra note 139, at 531.
143. See generally Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 138, at 76 (“From the owner’s perspective, there are
certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately owned and consumed. Because
the excess capacity is not used, certain types of goods are systematically underexploited.” (emphasis
added)).
144. Dyal-Chand, supra note 135, at 253-54 (“In the areas of home and car sharing . . . individuals
also share the excess capacity of assets that they do not fully use or need for themselves with
strangers—for a price.” (footnote omitted)).
145. Kochan, supra note 125, at 947.
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Most important in the access story behind the sharing economy is the
advent of technological capacity that has only recently materialized to create the
market infrastructure, complete with reliability and security measures, necessary to
make such sharing efficient.146 As lower-cost, higher reliability mechanisms for
making sharing more accessible and more profitable improve, expansion of sharing
activity follows.
Professor Julia Lee explains that new “[t]echnology has enabled
innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an ever-broader range of
products and services.”147 With these technologies, connections are made with
greater ease between the owners who can supply a product and the consumers who
want to access it for a limited time or limited purpose. 148 Ratings systems—run
through internet repositories and social networks-- that develop around the sharing
activity reduce risks of dealing with strangers because of the reputational controls
inherent in system. These systems in turn allow consumers to comment on
suppliers and suppliers to comment on consumers of the shared products or
services. 149 These trust- and reputation-networks create monitoring, verification,
and quality-control mechanisms that are key to making sharing platforms attractive
and safe.150 Reliable monitoring and rating systems can now be scaled because of
the new information and connectivity technology.151 With roaming, for example, an
owner might keep out roamers with reputations for poor stewardship.
These systems generate confidence for consumers and for suppliers, each
made more comfortable entering the sharing arrangements because they know
accountability and reputational rating systems are available to assist their decision
making and deter bad behavior.152 The Economist posited that the technological
platforms supporting the sharing economy make it so that there is “the availability
of more data about people and things [which] allows physical assets to be
disaggregated and consumed as services.”153 This technological infrastructure
supports the sharing economy because it provides “the market-thickening
coordination mechanisms . . . such as coordinating on time and geography”
previously present only in physical markets.154

146. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2017); The Rise of the Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything is
for Hire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-interneteverything-hire-rise-sharing-economy (“technology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets
cheaper and easier than ever—and therefore possible on a much larger scale.”).
147. Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 141 (2015).
148. See generally Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 67 (2016).
149. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 2, 8 (explaining that the sharing economy businesses
have proliferated in part because of technological advances but also because emerging “recommender
systems and reputation systems . . . are central to the function of P2P rental markets.”).
150. Id at 8; see also Stemler, supra note 148 (discussing these “modern trust” systems).
151. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 146, at 1635.
152. See Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, The Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback
Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem”, U. MIAMI L. REV. 830, 869 (2016).
153. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 146.
154. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 7.
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It is this technology that can operate in a market to roam—where owners
can share access to land with roamers who desire it. Because legal systems evolve
in concert with technology, it should be expected that they can evolve around
roaming rights to coordinate sharing relationships and serve the information costreducing functions that have been seen in other already developed sharing markets.
Experience proves that legal arrangements that are once uncertain suddenly can
operate with the requisite reliability to support their adoption once paired with the
right technological assistance.
VII.

BY WHAT MARKET MECHANISM WILL WE IDENTIFY THE
TRADEABLE RIGHT TO ROAM? THE EVOLUTION AND
ADAPTABILITY OF PROPERTY FORMS

Some may argue that we need to accept or acknowledge new property
forms to facilitate the creation of roaming rights as severable from property estates.
Alternatively, a roaming market could be created by simply relying to facilitate
roaming access on existing property forms (such as licenses and easements—
including time-limited ones) or on existing contract forms. While it is likely that a
market would emerge using existing mechanisms—much like homesharing adapted
existing mechanisms to accomplish its goals—this part will briefly explain why
property law itself is suited to adapt to the roaming market even if it does end up
requiring the creation of new property forms. In fact, the technological revolution
being witnessed within the sharing economy seems a perfect test for understanding
the capability of the property system to adapt and evolve. This evolution happens in
a manner that preserves the core attributes of having a predictable and identifiable
legal substructure with a shared and understandable vocabulary.
In a market to roam, owners with the right to exclude could choose to (1)
grant contracts that allow access for roaming, a category of rights for which owners
have wide latitude within contracts law;155 (2) use existing property forms like
licenses, easements, or leases to accomplish the creation of property-based or
contract-plus-property hybrid rights to roam between owner-grantors and roamergrantees (or accomplish the same exchanges with platforms that thereafter would
assign rights to actual roamers); or (3) give up a portion of their right to exclude by
transferring a roaming right to others in the nature of some new property form that
grants an inclusion stick carved out of the exclusion right. If the market to roam
only utilizes existing contract or existing property forms, much of what is discussed
in this Part is irrelevant. The idea of creating roaming contracts in categories (1)
and (2) is less susceptible to criticism than the latter property right, which some
might see as the creation of a new property form.156

155. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2000) (“A willing buyer and a willing seller can create
an infinite variety of enforceable contracts for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can
describe these property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices.”).
156. See id. at 3 (“A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to
‘customize’ legally enforceable interests” where “[t]he parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical
or fanciful as they like” but property is more rigid.).
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The creation of roaming rights that can be traded seems like a
straightforward extension of the bundle of sticks concept of ownership,157 when
property in a thing can be disaggregated into a variety of legal interests in the thing.
But how far the bundle metaphor can be extended is a regular subject of debate.158
Considerations over just how far property rights can evolve and adapt to
accommodate new interests in splitting property into new, discrete customized
interests are key concerns.
By engaging with the literature on the connections between technological
innovation and the feasibility for the property system to absorb the creation of new
property forms, the argument for a “market to roam” as a feasible evolution in our
appreciation of enforceable rights is strengthened. Despite the fact that a new
property form is likely unnecessary, there could be a reason to identify a separate
property interest in roaming—a process that could butt heads with arguments
disfavoring the creation of new property forms. As those crafting a market to roam
begin to get creative and innovate, new property forms might allow for greater
customization of property relationships between owners and roamers or between
owners and platforms. The benefits from long-term and durable commitments may
counsel embracing new property forms as the vehicle for transferable roaming
rights as a better means to generate stronger property-based relationships than what
could be created through existing property forms or contracts.
Thus, to give the architects of the new market to roam wide berth for
navigating us toward a system that works most effectively, this part will focus on
why, even if a new roaming right needed to be created and identified as a separate,
new interest, it would not pose a threat to the stability of the system of property
forms. In the process, the analysis also helps tell a story about how technology can
facilitate the market to roam and aid the acquisition of information necessary for it
to function well as a system of rights’ exchange.
New technologies that manage trust problems like we see emerging in the
sharing economy already should help spur easy, low transaction cost roaming
rights. The question whether the system of property can accommodate such
transactional arrangements requires some basic preliminary analysis. As previewed
above, the rest of this part takes on that task. Although some scholars question the
capability of the property system to support subdivision of rights, or sticks, in the
property rights bundle, emerging technologies might be capable of breaking down
barriers to new legal interests.159 New sharing economy mechanisms are
demonstrating just how such technologies can make transactions in subdivided
property bundles more accessible to owners and users of property160 and these

157. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127-28 (explaining that the bundle of sticks means that
“Particular rights—the right to harvest timber or to cross a particular piece of land—represent individual
sticks; various rights holders have bundles of varying composition with respect to particular parcels of
land.”).
158. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 3 (explaining that fragmentation must be controlled to
maintain optimal standardization of property rights, but that “[t]here is a spectrum of possible
approaches to property rights, ranging from total freedom of customization on the one hand to complete
regimentation on the other.”).
159. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127-28.
160. See supra Part VI.
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should be capable of extension, enabling technological facilitation of markets in
ecological resources.
Manipulating one’s package of property ownership rights to include others
in its use and enjoyment requires a determination of the extent to which property
rights are flexible and customizable. Consider the role of technology in the sharing
economy and the way it has generated brand new ways to maximize the utility of
property by putting to work underutilized assets in land and goods. New
technology eliminates some of the concerns against newly customized forms of
property, and the reason roaming rights could be recognized without offending the
principles that work to cabin the universe of acceptable property forms. That this is
an unthreatening prospect to the system of property standardization is revealed
after examining the arguments against creating new forms of property.
One of the arguments against customizable forms of property and the
division of interests in property has been the fear that an unlimited set of diverse
forms of ownership would be impractical to administer and enforce, with the
market itself incapable of adequately understanding the division of rights in a way
that could allow for efficient trading in them. For this reason, strong advocates of
the numerus clausus principle—which holds that “property rights must conform to
certain standardized forms” and the set of available forms is a closed, finite list
limited to existing property forms thereby not permitting the creation of novel
property forms outside the list161—advocate for a closed system that prohibits new
entrants into the scheme of recognized property forms.162 Professors Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith explain why property forms are limited while contract
forms are not.163 Unique problems can be generated when third parties must
identify the meaning of novel forms in the property context in order to evaluate the
nature of the property rights held.164 In contract law, third party reliance issues are
less present.165 Merrill and Smith explain this information cost problem with
property forms and conclude that its existence requires the property system to
identify and work toward the optimal standardization (and limitation of the
number) of forms in property law:
The root of the difference, we suggest, stems from the in rem nature of
property rights: When property rights are created, third parties must expend time
and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating
them and to acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual property
rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those
creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to
take these increases in measurement costs fully into account, making them a true
externality. Standardization of property rights reduces these measurement costs.166

161. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 4.
162. Id. at 3 (explaining the purposes of a fixed set of enforceable property forms and that,
“[g]enerally speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited
number of standard forms.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id. at 3, 8.
166. Id. at 8.
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There are high information costs in translating the rights available in any
particular property transaction and in understanding what rights others have in the
piece of property one wishes to acquire.167 According to Merrill and Smith, the
existence of high transaction costs associated with new and novel property forms
necessitates that property law work with a closed set of optimal standard forms so
that everyone engaging in property transactions is speaking the same language and
capable of assessing the nature of each estate. To do otherwise, they contend,
would inject indeterminacy in property forms in a manner that would impede trade
in property.168
Yet, even some of the strongest advocates for a closed set of property
forms, like Merrill and Smith, nonetheless recognize that technological changes
have the capacity to break down some of the objections to allowing new form
entrants.169 Under Merrill and Smith’s “information-cost theory of the numerus
clausus,” the availability of technology that provides “cheaper information” makes
new property forms less objectionable.170 For example, they explain that the “strict
formality requirements” normally required in negotiable instruments break down as
technology improves: “when technology furnishes alternative means of promoting
reliance (including lowering the need to measure risk), there is less need for the
standardization provided for by the requirements of negotiability.”171
The technology that can facilitate transactions recognizing distinct
roaming rights, already proving itself in other aspects of the sharing economy,
should diminish resistance from those that might worry about a market to roam
expanding recognizable and enforceable property forms. As Merrill and Smith
admit, “to the extent that technological change allows cheaper notice of relevant
interests, the need for standardization by the law will be somewhat diminished,”
and “technology that lowers information costs can be expected to weaken the
numerus clausus” principle.172 If it can be done in a verifiable and identifiable way,
then recognizing a new form of property right to roam as a separable, tradeable
stick in an owner’s bundle of rights would not disrupt optimal standardization of
forms.
This conclusion is also consistent with the work of Professors Bruce
Yandle and Andrew Morriss, who describe technology—whether it be in physical
form like barbed wire or in legal innovations like land registries—as an accelerator
of property rights evolution.173 Professors Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill reach
167. Id. at 40; see also Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 140 (“One important class of
transaction costs relates to measuring and monitoring the items transferred among trading parties. Where
the ability to define, defend, and therefore, monitor such transfers is lacking, alienability and gains from
trade cannot be obtained, and contracts cannot be enforced.”).
168. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 31.
169. Id. at 40 (“Our explanation of the numerus clausus generates some general predictions about the
way in which property regimes will change over time: As the costs of standardization to the parties and
the government shift, we expect the optimal degree of standardization to rise or fall.”).
170. Id. at 41-42.
171. Id. at 42.
172. Id.
173. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127 (describing the “technologies” affecting property
rights in terms of physical world technologies (like barbed wire) and legal innovations (like recording
statutes)).
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similar conclusions, crediting the advent of new technologies as transforming the
nature of property rights in the American West.174
Changes in the physical, legal, technological, and social environment
surrounding and impacting property ownership and usage have the capacity to alter
our understanding of the optimal configuration of property rights.175 Quite simply,
property rights can carry more customized operational baggage when technology
lightens the load. Yandle and Morriss explain that, “The technology of property
rights can be understood by thinking about this bundle of sticks. Technology, either
in law or in a more conventional sense, allows increasingly sophisticated
definitions of property rights and allocation of particular sticks to either private
property owners or public entities.”176 They describe this inherent flexibility and
adaptability in the property system as facilitating “unbundling” the rights within the
property rights bundle of sticks in three ways: (1) “technology can affect what
rights can be placed into the bundles of sticks. Thus a legal change or scientific
innovation may place something within the category of things that may be owned
or may remove it from that category;”177 (2) “technology can make it possible to
subdivide property rights within a particular bundle in new ways;”178 and (3)
“technology may make different forms of property possible.”179 All three of these
unbundling mechanisms seem present in the creation of a market to roam as
facilitated by platform technologies like those seen in already emerging sharing
economy sectors. Consider how Yandle and Morriss describe the conditions for
unbundling:
Unbundling is a vital component of the process of property rights
evolution. All of the paths out of the tragedy of the commons
require creating and allocating some new stick or sticks in a
property rights bundle. Although the paths differ in what they
require to create and allocate a stick, each path involves some
combination of defining, defending, and enabling transferability
of property rights.180
The technology that would be employed in sharing access would
accomplish that definitional, supportive, and enabling work.
The dynamic nature of property rights makes them adaptable to serve
more and more functions, including social ones that might have seemed to some
only possible if exclusion were limited by the state. And the “[c]hanges in property
rights technology [that] can alter the mix of costs associated with defining,
defending, and enabling transferability as well as the relative magnitudes of the

174. See generally Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163, 164-65, 167, 172-75 (1975) (discussing technological innovations
as one of the factors that “govern changes in the content of property rights,” with branding and barbed
wire as key examples).
175. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127.
176. Id. at 128.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 129.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 135.
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various cost generators”181 can be seen in the new technologies capable of
facilitating the creation of roaming rights tradeable in a market to roam. When the
benefits increase and costs decrease for applying new technology, the incentive
calculus changes for investing in activity. Individuals will expend more time and
resources on innovative new ways to define and enforce property rights.182
As earlier parts of this article illustrate, new technologies have emerged to
make it possible to generate identifiable interests while creating the transparency
and monitoring necessary to make exchanging roaming rights an efficient transfer
and one that should receive legal acknowledgement and enforcement. The
explanation by Yandle and Morriss about the conditions that should exist to
recognize new property rights serves as a blueprint for the application of
technology to the roaming rights market:
Defining, defending, and gaining agreement involve three aspects
of property rights technology. For any type of property right to
exist, the resource itself must be identified and its amount and
quality measured. To defend the defined rights to the resource,
threats and harms must be identified and measured. For rationing
and exchange to take place, resource activity must be monitored
and recorded. These categories of technology can include basic
scientific knowledge about the resource and threats to it, as well
as meters, remote sensing and recording devices, fences, brands,
and identifying marks. The third category, gaining agreement,
generally involves the use of some kind of two-way
communications technology that provides information, feedback,
and recorded agreement or disagreement between and among
people who would normally transact with each other.183
The identification, measurement, monitoring, recording, and feedback
requirements can all be met within a market to roam facilitated by platform
technologies.
If policymakers identify these functions of technology and construct
roaming rights with each of those criteria in mind, and if the demand exists for
roaming, a market to roam should be feasible whether we rely on an expansion of
existing property forms to do the job or whether we use existing vehicles in
contracts or property to facilitate the transfer of the appropriate rights. If new
property forms are necessary, the disruption to the system will be minimal, if any,
given the technological innovations that allow us identify, monitor, and track the
discrete interests associated with the market-based right to roam.
VIII.

WHAT OPERATIONAL HURDLES MIGHT WE ANTICIPATE TO
OVERCOME AS WE DESIGN ROAMING MARKETS?

As we sketch out the contours of a possible market to roam, it is important
to recognize some of the hurdles to its effective functioning and to be honest about
181. Id. at 139; see also Anderson & Hill, supra note 174, at 178 (“Technological change or lower
resource prices will increase property rights activity.”).
182. Anderson & Hill, supra note 174, at 167, 178.
183. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 141.
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some of its limitations that could make it less than satisfying to those who push for
more roaming access. By acknowledging and cataloging these concerns, the hope is
that market to roam entrepreneurs will start to innovate toward solutions to
minimize their incidence or impact on achieving a robust roaming market. In
providing some preliminary awareness of these problems, perhaps brainstorming
will begin and solutions may follow.
A good starting point is a list of concerns that Professor Neil Hamilton
developed to examine what should be done with any expanded access system to
incentivize private property owners to allow more public access to their lands.184
As he explains: “The challenge is developing a mechanism to encourage private
owners to open their lands for private use. One question to consider here is: What
would it take for a private landowner to be willing to allow some forms of public
use of a property?”185 Hamilton answers his question with a very useful list.186
Several of the items on the list call for more governmental intervention than is
advocated here. Others may prove useful where the hope is to sketch a roaming
system that is minimally dependent on government coordination and more purely
market-oriented. Additional issues not included on Hamilton’s list are also
discussed below.
A.

Liability of Property Owners

Property owners may be reluctant to engage in roaming transactions for
fear of liability for injuries to roamers with whom they contract.187 One can
imagine a situation where a roamer either is granted permission for free or for a fee,
stumbles while roaming, and suffers bodily injury. The law will presumptively treat

184. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 202.
185. Id.
186. Id. Hamilton’s list of what must be provided in order to encourage property owners to offer
more access:
1. Protections from liability for anything that might happen to people while they are on the land, even if
compensation is provided.
2. An ability to be compensated if there were damages or other harm that happened, e.g., crops
destroyed or fences damaged.
3. Some assurance of adequate supervision or management with increased public safety patrols by the
game warden, sheriff, or county conservation board.
4. Clear designations as to which property is open for public use and which is not, such as through
signage and other markings, and an indication of the types of activities allowed.
5. A process for establishing well-understood limitations on the extent of public use—such as time and
manner restrictions—e.g., permitting walking only on trails or closing land to public use during hunting
season or calving.
6. Forms of compensation to provide significant economic benefits or tax breaks for participating in the
program.
7. Some form of restriction or record-keeping so users can be identified and informed of the rules,
permit fees can be collected, and user rights and obligations communicated.
8. Some method of public recognition and acknowledgement for providing the public benefits.
Id.
187. Id. at 201 (explaining that private landowners are “fearful of allowing any form of public use
due to worries about liability if someone is injured”).
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the roamer as a licensee or invitee and exposure to tort liability may follow.188
Although the law sometimes makes owners liable also to trespassers, that liability
risk is very low.189 When the relationship changes and the roamer is there by
permission, the property owner may be forced to take on new duties that would not
have existed but for that permission. Consequently, many owners may be deterred
from agreeing to offer their properties in a market to roam because of this risk
exposure, with potential liabilities likely far exceeding any fees they could charge.
Alternatively, any fees that might be charged and adjusted upward to account for
the liability risk might be too high to generate willing roaming customers. The risk
could either drive out suppliers or drive up costs so high that demand is lost.
The law has already attempted some solutions to have the best of both
worlds—more owners permitting access while limiting the risk of liability. Socalled “recreational use statutes” adopted across the states provide a liability shield
to property owners who allow strangers to recreate on their property.190 Every state
has adopted some version of this kind of protective legislation to encourage owners
to allow greater access.191 As the Alabama statute declares, for example:
[I]t is in the public interest to encourage owners of land to make
such areas available to the public for non-commercial purposes
by limiting such owners’ liability towards persons entering
thereon for such purposes [and] that such limitation on liability
would encourage owners of land to allow non-commercial public
recreational use of land which would not otherwise be open to
the public.192

188. See, e.g., 48 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 275 (1987). The following summarizes the basic
standards of tort liability for those who enter property with permission: “An invitee is one entering the
premises on the landowner’s or occupier’s invitation. A licensee is uninvited, but enters with the
owner’s or occupier’s permission or acquiescence . . . Under the traditional common-law approach . . .
an invitee is owed a duty of ordinary care, but trespassers and licensees are obliged to take the premises
as they find them, and the possessor of the land owes them only a duty of refraining from wanton and
willful injury, insofar as the condition of the premises is concerned.” Id.
189. William Rooks & Caitlin Dorné, Torts, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 219 (2014) (“[C]ourts
generally hold that a landowner or occupier is under no duty to anticipate a trespasser’s presence. And
where a landowner or occupier neither knows of the trespasser’s presence nor the danger, no duty arises
to maintain the premises;” but, “a landowner or occupier may not lay a trap with the intent to harm
trespassers.”).
190. Id. at 201 n.76 (“The fears relating to potential liability if users are injured have been addressed
in the various recreational use laws passed in most states”); see also Kenlan, supra note 74, at 197 (“As
an alternative to creating statutory rights to access private land, other provisions of Maine law encourage
landowners to permit public access voluntarily. For example, Maine’s landowner liability law protects
landowners against tort claims from members of the public injured while on private land.”); George W.
Royer, Jr., Protection for the Recreational Property Landowner: The Alabama Recreational Use
Statutes, ALABAMA LAWYER, Jan. 2018, at 18, 19. (“the [Alabama] Recreational Use Statutes provide
substantial protection to the owners of non-commercial recreational property for injuries sustained by
users of such property.”).
191. Kahr, supra note 33, 90-91 (“Several commentators have examined the question of the proper
scope of landowner liability for recreational uses of private lands, and consideration of the problem has
provoked every state legislature to adopt some form of liability limitation for private landowners that
permit public recreational uses of their property.”).
192. ALA. CODE § 35-15-20.
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The basic hope is that the recreational use statutes will motivate riskaverse property owners to provide greater recreational access to the public over
their private lands. Oftentimes, a state statute will expressly eliminate a duty of
care in relation to a stranger’s recreational use. Maine, for example, provides that
“[a]n owner . . . of premises does not have a duty of care to keep the premises safe
for entry or use by others for recreational . . . activities or to give warning of any
hazardous condition . . . to persons entering for those purposes.”193
These statutory protections should be extended as far as possible to apply
to permissions granted within a market to roam. Nonetheless, they may often be of
little assistance to encouraging owners to engage in the permissions anticipated by
this article’s proposal. In some states, for example, the protection of a recreational
use statute focuses on whether a fee is charged for the permission or access related
to the recreational use. Iowa’s statute, for instance, provides that a property owner
“who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to
use such property for recreational purposes or urban deer control does not . . .
assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property
caused by an act or omission of such persons.”194 This approach would obviously
make these laws ineffective at solving the liability problems associated with a
market to roam if that market (in whole or in part) relied on the possibility of feebased roaming rights.195 Because liability exposure in those circumstances would
remain under many of the recreational use statutes presently operative, some
broader legislative protection might be necessary to encourage more owners to
allow roaming. Some states like Alabama, for example, allow owners to gain the
protection of its recreational use liability shield even if the owners charge fees, so
long as the fees are not for a profit.196 In such states, though, if one is permitting
access for the purpose of making a profit then the statutory protection does not
apply.197
Given their limited scope, the existing recreational use statutes are illequipped to foster fee-based sharing relationships for roaming access. They do not
give enough property owners sufficient confidence that they will not face
additional liabilities if they participate in a right to roam.
Beyond statutory shields, other mechanisms might emerge and should be
explored to handle the liability problem. Several mechanisms from the categories
of contracts and insurance immediately come to mind. Contractual disclaimers of
liability are a possibility, but they will be subject to the limitations on, and
indeterminacy of, enforceability that always follow such provisions.198 Contracts

193. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, § 159-A (2015).
194. IOWA CODE § 461C.4 (2013) (emphasis added).
195. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 202 n.79 (“[Usually] the law does not provide liability protection
when users are asked to pay a price or fee for permission to use the land[.]”).
196. Royer, supra note 190, at 20.
197. Id. (such as by charging access fees larger than for pure administrative costs).
198. Contractual disclaimers are an option, but courts sometimes ignore them to serve broader policy
goals; thus, they are not iron-clad and one should go into their use with one’s eyes open to the
possibility a disclaimer might not be enforced. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM § 2 (2010) (explaining the consequences of “the plaintiff in dealing with the defendant
[accepting] a contractual disclaimer of liability” yet the situation where “if the particular disclaimer is so
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could require roamers themselves to carry insurance policies for their own roaming
injuries (and, perhaps to also cover the roamers’ own liability for damages to the
owners’ property while roaming). In other words, roamers might be required to buy
insurance for injuries suffered while roaming or for the infliction of damages to
properties on which they roam before suppliers would be willing to exchange with
them in the roaming market. Whether this could prove a disincentive to purchase
roaming rights will have to be seen and will largely depend on what insurance
instruments are developed by the insurance industry in response to a new demand.
Similarly, participating property owners could purchase insurance to cover their
risks of liability to this new category of third parties on their properties. Here too,
insurance companies’ capability to provide a low-cost vehicle for risk protection
will play a role in the cost calculus. Finally, to the extent that the properties in the
roaming market are managed by a platform, the platform could be the entity
obtaining insurance, capitalizing on its market power, economies of scale, and
greater risk spreading to drive down the cost of insurance, making it cheaper than if
each property owner or roamer had to obtain insurance piecemeal. Much like
Airbnb’s “Host Protection Insurance” program,199 the platforms running the
roaming market could obtain insurance and then offer policies to the property
owner roaming-hosts at affordable rates that provide adequate enough coverage to
encourage host-owner participation.
B.

Adverse Possession, Prescriptive Easement, and Implied Dedication
Issues

Whenever strangers begin to traverse upon or use private lands, there is
always a risk that their use or occupation could rise to a level of protected legal
status—even without the property owners’ consent. For example, in all states,
statutes provide that non-owners may “adversely possess” property in a manner
that gives them rights to property if they meet certain elements of adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted occupation for multiple years.200 Although it is very
difficult to meet the requirements to prove adverse possession and it is very easy
for an owner to assert their rights during the statute of limitations to eject the
trespasser (defeating the occupier’s claim to the continuous possession necessary to
complete the elements of adverse possession), once an occupier meets the elements
they get title to it as a matter of law and consequently the owner loses title.201 A
similar doctrine recognized in all states involves “prescriptive easements.”202 With
elements very similar to adverse possession, a “prescriptive easement” can be
broadly written as to clearly include claims based on recklessness as well as negligence, courts in some
jurisdictions might find that such a disclaimer violates public policy and should not be enforced.”).
199. AIRBNB Host Insurance Protection, https://www.airbnb.com/host-protection-insurance.
200. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 144; Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse
Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (1918).
201. JERRY L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW: PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES 115-19, 144 (2014); see also Donald J. Kochan, Keepings, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 355,
379-84 (2015) (providing a detailed discussion of adverse possession and the mechanisms by which
owners can defeat an attempt to adversely possess).
202. See generally SINGER supra note 120, § 5.4; Scope of Prescriptive Easement for Access
(Easement of Way), 79 A.L.R. 4th 604 (1990).
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established when someone uses the property of another adversely and continuously
across a defined statutory period without permission or interruption from the owner
of the fee over which the use is made.203 Courts recognize a few other types of
implied dedications or implied easements as well, based on the behavior of the
parties204—such as when a user of the property relies detrimentally on promises
from the owner that the user may continue to use the property, permitting the user
of the property to make a claim for an easement by estoppel.205
To effectively incentivize property owners to allow roamers on their
property, concerns over potential adverse possession, prescriptive easement, or
implied dedication claims will need to be addressed.206 Such claims by roamers are
likely to be defeated within a market to roam because of the documentation of
permissive and limited use that would exist by the language of the roaming contract
or other instrument conferring roaming rights. The elements of adversity or implied
dedication can be overcome by looking to the purposes and permissions that gave
rise to the presence of the roamer and the roaming activity, evidencing the absence
of necessary elements under any of these doctrines. Nonetheless, it might be
prudent to consider whether legislation declaring that any such roaming conducted
within a market to roam shall not give rise to these claims—absent some
extraordinary showing of defiance of an access agreement—should be adopted to
ensure that owners are not chilled from entering the roaming-property supply chain
by the perceived possibility of such claims.207
C.

Land Assembly Issues / Checkerboard Risks

Participation in the right to roam needs to be extensive if it is to provide
effective and attractive supply of access. It is likely that hikers and roamers will
seldom want a path through only a single property. If they cannot assemble a rights
package that allows them to complete a full roaming experience, they may be
unwilling to purchase or subscribe to any roaming rights at all. This is often an
argument presented to claim that only the government can manage an access
regime.208
The system needs to work on attracting property owners as participants to
overcome the potential that multiple lands cannot be assembled to provide a
valuable combined product. If there is not an uninterrupted path for roaming across

203. SINGER, supra note 117, § 5.4.
204. Id. at § 5.3.
205. Id. at § 5.3.1.
206. Kahr, supra note 33, at 90-91 (discussing the necessity of policies addressing adverse
possession, prescriptive easement, and liability for injuries risks associated with allowing recreational
use on private land if we are to incentivize private owners to grant access rights).
207. Id. at 81 (“Legal rules limiting adverse possession exposure, implied dedication findings, and
liability for third-party accidents when a landowner allows public recreational use of private land
introduce incentives for owners of unenclosed land to acquiesce to” public access (including for off-road
vehicles)).
208. See, e.g., Hynes, supra note 32, at 978 (“[T]here are several possible market failures that could
justify public action,” including “an anti-commons problem may prevent effective private sector action.
For example, a hiking trail may need to cross several parcels, and each parcel may hold out and demand
a payment equal to the entire value of the trail.”).
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multiple contiguous parcels, the desirability of the rights will be diminished.
Innovators should work to find ways to create integrated networks of property
owners. The level of difficulty cannot be fully known until a spontaneously-ordered
market is set loose and entrepreneurs start to innovate from the bottom up to find
solutions to overcome these hurdles. As indicated earlier, private organizations
have already shown success at cobbling together multiple access rights to create
substantial trails for snowmobile and other access. Thus, it can be done. And, with
proper organization, clarity of benefits, and outreach—especially if facilitated by
platforms that have an interest in assembling large portfolios of access rights—
hopefully the risk that rights would only be available in disconnected squares on a
checkerboard can be minimized.
D.

Transaction Costs Associated with Acquiring Rights from Multiple
Owners and Identification of Participating Properties

A related, but somewhat different, concern is that roamers may face
prohibitively high transaction costs if they are required to negotiate with multiple
owners to put together a roaming path across multiple properties. This is where the
organizational and informational elements of platform providers can be brought to
bear. Platforms can bring their proven skills to this coordination problem and keep
transaction costs low, allowing roamers to use the platform as the intermediary.
The platforms and the technology they generate should also find ways to maximize
the information available to consumers in the roaming market to make the
identification of participating properties easy—both in advance planning and while
“in the field” when they might need to navigate around non-participating parties or
engage in new transactions during, and in order to continue with, a roaming
experience.
E.

Who sets the prices?

The platforms could also serve as a way to standardize prices and to
overcome perverse incentives for landowners to hold out (such as when wanting to
be the last in a chain of properties necessary to assemble a full trail) or otherwise
charge exorbitantly high prices. In fact, this may become an even more critical role
for platforms than it is in something like Airbnb or Uber. Roaming is different
because the roamer may need to patch together several distinct properties. That is
not a problem for Airbnb, because people choose one property for the full
experience (they are not changing lodging locations every hour).
At the same time, however, there will need to be ways to account for
variation in prices depending on the value of the experience offered from any
particular property even while trying to avoid pricing behaviors by individual
suppliers that inhibit the market’s success. With Uber, for example, the main thing
the customer usually cares about is time (setting aside safety and the comfort level
of the ride at the margin). But in the roaming market it is more likely that different
properties might have different ecological amenities and other experience values
that make the value of the roaming different on different properties. In that sense,
the pricing might be handled more like Airbnb where different dwellings offer
different value.
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Compensation to Landowners for Damages

Landowners may want easy vehicles for bringing claims against roamers
for damages to the lands used. Contract provisions will likely accomplish most of
the work here, but both the types of damages claims and the dispute resolution
formats should be carefully examined as the market emerges. If landowners feel
that damage to property will be frequent, that responsibility will be hard to assess,
that dispute resolution will be costly, or that judgments will be difficult to collect,
they may be reluctant to enter the market, especially if prices are not high enough
to cover the risks. Here, as with personal injury liability, insurance markets could
emerge to minimize some of the risks to the landowner of suffering uncompensated
property damage and to minimize some of the risks of liability of the roamers to the
landowners through property damages claims. Investigation should be made as to
how insurance could become available and benefit both sides of the transaction.
G. Public Safety and Crime Prevention
Any permissive access regime introduces the risk that those gaining access
might pose a public safety risk or use the access to further criminal purposes. If you
let people inside the fence—proverbial or real—they are one less step removed
from committing a criminal act to the residents or their property. The more frequent
lawful presence of non-owners on land may also make it harder to identify who
belongs and who does not. Local law enforcement officials should develop
strategies to adapt to the changed circumstances from increased roaming activity.
Property owners too should find ways to minimize their personal risk and assure
their safety when strangers become a more frequent and proximate part of their
daily experience. It is likely that some property owners may find these safety
concerns too high a risk, leading some to choose not to offer their properties in the
market to roam. Others will invest in new security measures to lower the risks and
some will increase the price charged for roaming to make that costs of bearing the
risk more tolerable. Platforms or local governments could also adapt to provide
greater security in response to the emerging market and increased foot traffic across
these private lands.
H. Reliability of Cellular and Satellite Service
Much of the success of the market to roam may depend on the reliability
of mobile phone cellular and satellite service. If we presume that a roaming market
may depend on “in the field” transactions, those would be hard to process if one
cannot stay connected. Service will also be required for navigating through
participating properties, for getting pinged when alerts are necessary (such as when
traversing outside boundaries or into new properties), for emergency assistance,
and for platforms and owners to monitor movements so that they can hold roamers
responsible for any damages or deviations from permissions. This need for service
may cause functional concerns, but also could be a participation deterrent. The
possibility of unreliable service may make the experience in a roaming market less
worthwhile meaning fewer might pursue it; and, owners may be less willing to
participate when they realize that their monitoring abilities may be compromised
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by service interruptions or dead zones. Such monitoring problems may also affect
the availability of insurance.
While some of these problems may be unavoidable, their recognition at
least allows market participants to adjust accordingly. And, it creates a target for
secondary attention where those interested in improving the roaming market may
have an incentive to assist with improving the universality of cellular service. As
the market to roam evolves, attention should be given to improvements in wireless
networks, cell tower placements, and in smart phone capabilities to minimize some
of these risks.
I.

Non-Universality or Other Interference with the Unbounded Connection
to the Earth

Finally, even if the market to roam results in increased access, it will
never be universal access because it is not compelled. This approach will likely, at
least at first, leave many progressive property scholars and other free movement
advocates wanting. The purity of open access without bargaining—because all
properties become part of the accessible lands portfolio and because it is an
unbounded and more natural connection with the earth—may seem lost when
individuals must engage in a market exchange for acquiring roaming rights. Even if
many of the rights are free or at minimal cost, the mere necessity of the transaction
can seem like an interruption in the freedom of the roam. Yet, if the advocates for
mandatory roaming rights also recognize that they are unlikely to ever see a
political environment that will permit such universal mandated access, perhaps
those advocates would be willing to support the development of what, in their
minds, might be a second best solution. Nevertheless, this Article does not pretend
that its proposal for a market to roam will serve as a perfect substitute for all of the
social and human values that some seek when they call for limits on exclusion and
the corresponding mandated conferral of roaming rights.
***
The market to roam is an alternative means of supplying roaming rights
that demands attention within the broader discussion on how to expand access
rights to private lands. Before presuming market failure (as those who advocate for
government-mandated roaming rights do), the values of emerging technologies and
business innovations breaking down barriers are worthy considerations.
IX.

THE COMPARATIVE UTILITY OF THE MARKET TO ROAM
OVER COERCED ACCESS

After successful solutions lead to an operating roaming market, there are
many reasons to believe that consensual roaming arrangements will lead to a
superior roaming experience with better stewardship of ecological resources than
with progressive property’s mandated “right to roam” statutes.209 There are reasons
to believe that protected and accountable access is better than free and lessmonitorable access. A system for sharing roaming rights through bargaining would

209. Claeys, supra note 9, at 463 (discussing the “adverse social consequences from roaming
statutes” that “have not been adequately considered in scholarship supportive of roaming rights.”).
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create accountability that is lacking in free-roaming regimes. After all, who
watches the roamers when the state is the one conferring the rights and the roamer
need not take any steps to seek advance permission to roam?210
Exclusion and the gatekeeping function are necessary to protect against
damage to property. As posited by Shawn Regan (who has, as discussed earlier,
been tracking innovative sharing economy approaches to natural resources access
problems), markets for access are about finding ways to allow access without
losing the benefits of control that allow owners to protect their property.211 As he
explains, private control over access with facilitation of inclusion by technology
becomes “about finding the right ways to contract with landowners to reduce the
risks of allowing access” rather than being about owners trying to lock out
others.212
In countries with free roaming via mandated access, there is very little
incentive to care for and to avoid exploiting the resources. The tragedy of the
commons kicks in for any resource for which one did not have to pay, one did not
have to bargain, and when the owner of the land has limited rights to expel
wrongdoers. Claeys projects this possibility:
A roamer wants to derive present enjoyment from crossing a particular
plot of land. It can seem churlish for an analyst to point out that, once roamers have
some right to enter land, they might not stick to the trails or stick to hiking.
Furthermore, the concerns that trouble landowners—lack of security, risks of
accident—are not certain to occur, and the resultant harms will take years to arise if
they ever really occur.213
Free roaming rights granted by the state but without any immediate owner
policing them risks overuse, depletion, and abuse of resources and activities more
difficult to monitor and control.214
Regan explains that, “Landowners, like all property owners, need to have
some control and protection against damages. The sharing economy can provide
that.”215 Through GPS technology associated with the smart phones that were used
to enter into the roaming agreement, for example, owners could track where and
when a particular roamer was in an area.216 So, if a fire started, vandalism occurred,
or ecological resources were otherwise damaged, the owner could track down the
responsible party (such as by knowing when the fire started and who was there at
the ignition point when it did). This could facilitate direct action against the roamer
for damages, or, as is often useful in other parts of the sharing economy, the owner

210. Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 662 (2001) (“Centralized regulatory agencies are ill-equipped to handle the
myriad ecological interactions triggered or impacted by private activity.”).
211. Regan, supra note 35, at 39.
212. Id.
213. Claeys, supra note 9, at 463.
214. See Adler, supra note 210, at 668-69 (generally discussing commons risks).
215. Regan, supra note 35, at 39.
216. Hynes, supra note 32, at 977-78 (Noting that “One South Dakota program already bases
landowners’ compensation on the amount of use by hunters, and technological advances could make it
much easier to track land usage by recreationists,” although recognizing potential cost concerns for
users and privacy risks.).
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has the ability to negatively affect the roamer’s reputation in the roaming
community. The risk of a bad rating with its consequential effects (such as a low
score that makes other owners refuse access) would serve as a deterrent against bad
behavior while on another’s land.
A free but mandated roaming regime has none of this. When individuals
have an entitlement to roam granted by the state, their entry, ingress and egress are
not tracked. The owner will not know who was on their property or when, so
seeking damages would be futile. Moreover, the roamers will be unidentifiable
nomads with little risk of reputational consequences for bad behavior, removing a
key deterrent to poor stewardship while on the lands. The state will not have the
resources to monitor or track behavior. Indeed, it may not even have the power to
do so given that the activities will be on private land burdened by roaming rights.
In contrast, private owners who exchange roaming rights will more often be on the
property because they are occupying it or caring for it on a personalized level rather
than a distant public manager, in proximity to the activity so more likely to observe
behavior at a low cost, and, as stated before, they have an incentive to watch their
land resource.
In fact, landowners who engage in the roaming-sharing market have
another incentive. The burdened-by-bargain landowner may have a new reason to
preserve the resources that attract roamers—maintenance of the character of the
ecological resources that attract these new trading partners in the first place. The
roamer-customers may represent a profit stream that flows from transacting in
roaming rights. If roamers like one’s property because of the beautiful landscape,
owners will take seriously threats to that landscape and protect against them. Thus,
by aligning the interests of the owner with the interests of the roamer, the owner’s
sensitivity to the natural ecological resources will be heightened.
X.

CONCLUSION

There are ecological resources in private property that can be shared by
more than the owners of the property. But it is the preservation and extension of
property rights that will generate the most efficient, fair, and effective sharing of
those resources, not mandated controls that force access and inclusion.217 By
preserving a property owner’s rights to manage the gates on her land, we give her
the power and incentive to open those gates. The constantly improving technology
facilitating exchanges in underutilized assets of land gives property owners the
means to negotiate exchanges for opening the gates as well as ways to monitor and
prevent harms to their land once the gates have been opened.
We should not allow progressive property scholars to control the narrative
that inclusion is only possible through coercion and that roaming rights can only
emerge through mandates. That narrative is simply one that seeks to diminish the
importance and chip away at the sanctity of the right to exclude in a system of
private property rights.
This article provides a challenge to those who would advocate for
statutorily-compelled roaming rights. It forces a debate about whether market
217. Adler, supra note 13, at 1022 (“Private property is not the enemy of conservation; it is its
foundation.”).
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mechanisms for roaming could accomplish some of the same goals but through
better means more respectful of property rights traditions. Gates which expand
access to ecological and other resources can be opened through consensual
exchange. Embracing exclusion and encouraging technological innovation in land
access exchange seems a far superior place to focus the roaming energy.

